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CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE 






China’s internet revolution has set off a furious debate in the West.  
Optimists from Thomas Friedman to Bill Clinton have predicted the crumbling of 
the Chinese Party-state, while pessimists suggest even greater state control.  But a 
far less discussed and researched subject is the effect of China’s internet 
revolution on its domestic institutions.  This article, the product of extensive 
interviews across China, asks a new and different question.  What has China’s 
internet revolution meant for its legal system?  What does cheaper if not free 
speech mean for Chinese judges? 
  The broader goal of this article is to better understand the relationship 
between how a legal system functions and how judges communicate, both with 
each other and with other parties, including the media, public, and political actors.   
Information transmission is an important but poorly understood part of any legal 
system. A precedent system, amicus briefs, and the rules on ex parte contacts all 
serve to regulate how parties in a system communicate, and what kind of 
information “counts.”  Media and political pressure cannot help but affect a legal 
system. The underlying premise is that the speech system surrounding the 
judiciary matters, and affects how judges decide cases. 
  The People’s Republic of China stands as a nearly ideal case to understand 
these more general questions.  Over the last fifteen years the Chinese legal system 
has undergone important transformations in the costs and means of disseminating 
information -- the consequence both of new technologies and of the 
commercialization of the Chinese media during the same period.   This has led to 
changes in both the information available to judges and the attention paid to the 
judiciary’s decisions.  Such changes have come precisely as the Chinese courts 
are undergoing dramatic reforms, whose stated aim is to make courts more 
competent, fair, and authoritative actors in the Chinese political system. 
                                                 
* Associate Professor and Director, Center for Chinese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. 
** Professor, Columbia Law School, Center for Chinese Legal Studies.  We are grateful for 
comments from participants in a seminar hosted by the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences, and in the Columbia Law School Junior Faculty Workshop.  We are indebted 
to Hu Jianjie, Peng Lingyan, Yang Fuhao, Zhang Lan, and Zhang Wenguang for outstanding 
research assistance. 
 We also gratefully acknowledge financial support for this project from the Stanley and 
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 An optimistic free speech theory suggests that greater exposure to 
information and ease of communications will be an unmitigated good for a legal 
system.  In the broader internet context, writers like Yochai Benkler, Eugene 
Volokh and Glenn Reynolds have argued that cheaper mass communications 
technology will improve government and lead to healthier political systems.1   As 
Benkler writes, “we are [now] witnessing a fundamental change in how 
individuals can interact with their democracy and experience their role as 
citizens.”   
 Our study of the Chinese judiciary 2  uncovers evidence to support the 
optimistic theory -- exciting examples of internet pressure that have uncovered 
injustice and forced courts and Communist Party officials to take action.  But 
overall we find a mixed picture that includes both optimistic, headline-grabbing 
stories and decidedly more ambiguous developments.   
 We present two groups of findings.  The first, under the heading Net 
Justice, are developments in communications between the judiciary and the media, 
public, and the Communist Party officials who oversee both the courts and the 
media.  The media and the public’s new ease in finding out what judges are doing 
has already clearly had important benefits.  In cases such as that of Sun Zhigang -- 
a university graduate brutally murdered in a detention center for migrant workers3 
-- it is clear that internet and media pressure led to both judicial action and 
salutary institutional reform.   But the flip side is the use of the internet to 
generate extreme public pressure and consequent political intervention in reaction 
to certain types of inflammatory cases.   That is, of course, not an entirely new 
development.  The Chinese legal system has long been characterized by Party-
state intervention in important or sensitive cases.   The difference is the rise of 
cases where public reaction and outrage online leads officials to intervene and 
predetermine or change judicial action.  In one of the examples discussed below, 
internet pressure resulted in a convicted gangster, Liu Yong, having his life 
sentence reversed, and being swiftly put to death.   The same efficiencies of 
communication that make exposing unfair or unjust decisions easier also facilitate, 
and make more likely, public pressure and political intervention. 
 The second set of findings is developments in Judicial Networks, or the 
communications patterns among judges.  There are signs of important changes in 
how Chinese judges communicate with each other.  Chinese judges have 
traditionally made decisions based on consultation that is mostly vertical— with 
“adjudication committees” that resolve difficult or sensitive cases within a court, 
with court presidents, with Communist Party Political-Legal Committees, and 
with higher courts.   Judges have had limited abilities to consult with other 
                                                 
1  YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF 
DAVIDS (2006); see also Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805 
(1995). 
2  In China, references to “the judiciary” and “judicial” encompass both the courts and the 
procuratorates.  In this article, we use “judiciary” and “judicial” to refer to the courts alone. 
3See infra Part II. 
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members of the judiciary outside their court, other than those in directly superior 
courts, and sometimes have had limited access to relevant laws and other legal 
materials.  Today, much is changing, particularly through use of the internet and 
other communications technologies.  Chinese judges increasingly communicate 
and consult along horizontal lines, with other judges, and also with academics and 
the public.   Many judges use the internet from home or web cafes to do extra 
research, finding either Chinese or foreign cases.  Judges report an emerging and 
informal system of quasi-precedent made possible by horizontal networking. 
Judges’ decisions are also much better publicized through a variety of means, 
including the internet, and as a result are subject to more external criticism. 
 Finally, in Innovative Uses, our study shows that some Chinese judges 
have begun use to the internet as a judicial tool in ways that are unusual and 
perhaps unprecedented in other parts of the world. For example, some judges use 
chat rooms and email in the course of deciding hard cases, communicating with 
other judges, academics, and even the public.  Other judges and courts maintain 
blogs that comment on cases, and make their case decisions available to the public 
and other judges.  These types of behavior are relatively unique and may lead to 
distinctly Chinese judicial communications practices. 
 
* * * 
 
 The study of the China’s judiciary yields important and general insights 
into the poorly understood relationship between judicial power and judicial 
speech.  As generations of American scholars have suggested, the power of the 
judiciary to act independently from other branches depends on the availability and 
acceptability of higher principles to which judges may appeal.  Whether Herbert 
Wechsler’s “neutral principles” or the appeals to tradition or accepted moral 
doctrine contemplated by others, 4  the degree to which society and other 
government actors accept the principles to which judges appeal does much to 
determine the judiciary’s power.   
 Changes in the costs and means of communication in a society can affect 
the ability of judges to make claims to legitimacy.   The major examples are 
through access to the laws themselves, and through the ease of forming judicial 
networks.  As horizontal, judge-to-judge communications become easier and 
cheaper, judges can make new claims to the authority to decide cases according to 
cases already decided.  Networked judges, like common-law judges, also gain the 
ability to learn from other judges.5    The development of horizontal judicial 
networking may be an crucial means for strengthening the autonomy and 
professional identity of courts. 
                                                 
4 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1959); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
5 See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, ch. 2 (2004) (describing global 
trend toward judicial networking). 
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 But there’s a flip side, for cheap communications also make it easier to 
attack the judiciary and diminish its legitimacy.  In the China example we see an 
extreme version -- the “internet manhunt” leading to political intervention -- with 
important lessons for the rest of the world.   The dominant writing on internet 
criticism in the United States stresses improvements in government and media 
accountability.  Yet not all criticism is socially useful, and when criticism is used 
as a political weapon against an already weak judiciary it does not improve 
governance but endangers progress toward a rule of law system.  At its worst, and 
when supported by the state, cheap mass criticism can lead to judges unwilling to 
make decisions that run the risk of inflaming the public, and a surrender of 
judicial authority to the vicissitudes of public opinion. 
 
* * * 
 
 The paper is divided into three parts.  Part I introduces theoretical 
background on the relationship between communications technologies, 
government, and judicial behavior.  Part II is a study of the Chinese judiciary.  
Part III discusses the relationship between speech and judicial legitimacy. 
  
I.  SPEECH AND INFORMATION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
A.  Free Speech, Information, and Government 
 
 Since the early 20th century the relationship among communications 
technologies, government, and free speech has been a field of intense interest. The 
rise of the telegraph, telephone, and the mass media of the 20th century led 
writers from Charles Cooley through Wilbur Schramm and Marshall McCullen to 
forecast great changes in human governance. 6   This is the field of 
“communications studies” of the 20th century, which in its earliest days tended to 
optimism.  Writers such as Charles Cooley wrote with moving confidence that 
technologies such as the telegraph might “make it possible for society to be 
organized more and more on the higher faculties of man, on intelligence and 
sympathy, rather than authority, caste, and routine.”7  These ideas reflected both a 
faith in technological progress and the more general belief in the power of free 
speech to improve society embodied in the American First Amendment. 
 One hundred years later, the optimism of the early 1900s was reborn 
during the internet revolution of the 1990s.   Consistent with the American free 
speech tradition the writing is mostly buoyant.  It suggests, with a few exceptions, 
that cheaper speech will yield a more participatory democratic culture, more 
attention to public opinion, and generally better and more responsive governments. 
                                                 
6 The field of early communications studies is far too vast to describe here.  For an introduction, 
see WILBUR LANG SCHRAMM, THE BEGINNINGS OF COMMUNICATION STUDY IN AMERICA: A 
PERSONAL MEMOIR (1997). 
7 CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, ON SELF AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 103 (1963). 
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One stream of writing centers on the governance processes of the internet 
itself, and how they might form a model for the “real world.”   The internet has 
been, since its inception, loosely governed by an informal management process 
dominated by technocratic engineers.  In Paulina Borsook’s 1995 Wired piece, 
“How Anarchy Works,”8 she described internet governance as the “kind of direct, 
populist democracy that most of us have never experienced.”  The engineers were 
“the masters of the metaverse” engaged in “a radical social experiment.” The 
thesis was that the internet’s founding engineers hadn’t just built a good network, 
but had solved certain intractable problems of human governance along the way. 
 Since the 1990s many have doubted whether internet governance serves as 
a plausible model for purposes other than technical standard-setting.  The 2006 
book Who Controls the Internet (co-authored by one of us) questioned the 
viability of government structures that lack access to physical coercion.9  Notably, 
since the 1990s, few areas of government have successfully mimicked the 
“working anarchy” of the early internet.  Instead the self-governance structures on 
the internet have turned to territorial government for assistance.  The internet, in 
turn, has increasingly become subject to the power of nation-state governments.10 
 In the 2000s, a new body of scholarship promoted the possibilities of 
internet-communications for improving the nature of national deliberation, in 
particular by supplementing or replacing traditional media as the primary source 
of scrutiny of government.  One of the first to present what we can now call 
“blogger theory” was Professor Eugene Volokh, in Cheap Speech and What It 
Will Do.11   Yochai Benkler presented a full treatment of this thesis in his book, 
The Wealth of Networks,12  as did writer Dan Gilmour in We the Media13 and law 
professor and blogger Glenn Reynolds in An Army of Davids.14   
  These authors present an attractive thesis: in a country where every citizen 
has the means to act as a critic, the result will be a more responsive government.   
Roughly the idea is that the marketplace of ideas has been hindered by barriers to 
market entry.   The high costs of communications have stood in the way of regular 
citizens participating in political discourse, leaving participation to specialized 
entities such as professional interest groups and the professional media.   But 
since the 1990s, the decreased costs of communication made possible by 
technological changes have facilitated greater access to the political process, 
making it possible for amateurs and regular citizens to be involved.  As Benkler 
writes, the rise of the internet has “fundamentally altered the capacity of 
individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active participants in the public 
                                                 
8 Paulina Borsook, How Anarchy Works: On Location with the Masters of the Metaverse, the 
Internet Engineering Task Force, WIRED, Oct. 1995, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.10/ietf.html. 
9 See generally, TIM WU & JACK GOLDSMITH, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, ch. 2,3 & 10 (2006). 
10 See generally, id. 
11 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995). 
12 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 212-272 (2006). 
13 DAN GILMOUR, WE THE MEDIA (2004). 
14 GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS (2006). 
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sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers . . . .  It is in this 
sense that the Internet democratizes.”15 
 The dissent from this view has come in clearest form from Professor Cass 
Sunstein in his books Republic.com and Echo Chambers.16  Sunstein argues that 
technologies such as the internet are not aiding national political discourse but 
splintering it.  “If Republicans are talking only with Republicans, if Democrats 
are talking primarily with Democrats, if members of the religious right speak 
mostly to each other, and if radical feminists talk largely to radical feminists, 
there is a potential for the development of different forms of extremism, and for 
profound mutual misunderstandings with individuals outside the group.”17  A glut 
of information and the ease of listening to only what you agree with, argues 
Sunstein, will lead to national factions that generally ignore one another -- the 
fractionalization of the Republic.18 
 China’s own internet revolution has touched off a similar debate.  Many 
argued that, in Thomas Friedman’s words, "the Internet and globalization, are 
acting like nutcrackers to open societies. . . .”  Bill Clinton argued that the Internet 
will “democratize opportunity in the world in a way that has never been the case 
in all of human history,”19 while George W. Bush argued that, in China, the 
Internet takes “freedom's genie . . .  out of the bottle.”   However, so far the 
political change forecast in the 1990s has been far less than predicted.   In 
previous work, we have explored many of the ways the Chinese Party-state has 
managed to maintain a grip on political power despite the dramatic changes in 
communications.  We have suggested that, in some ways, the Party-state has fine-
honed its use and control of information flows for political purposes. 20  
Nonetheless, writers from Friedman through Nicolas Kristof continue to argue 
that the Party-state’s grip will not survive the internet revolution. As Kristof wrote 
in a 2005 column, Death by a Thousand Blogs, “the Chinese leadership . . . is 
digging the Communist Party's grave, by giving the Chinese people broadband.”21 
                                                 
15 BENKLER, supra note 12, at 212. Writers like Benkler focus on internet-based, mass political 
movements that make use of network technology. For example, Benkler tells the story of how a 
variety of internet activists managed to make the security of Diebold voting machines a matter of 
public concern in the 2000s, an issue in which the mass media was originally uninterested. Other 
well-discussed examples are the internet-driven fundraising behind the Howard Dean campaign in 
the 2004 election, the exposure of fraud behind various anti-Bush war records, and the purge of 
Trent Lott from the Senate leadership.   The general tenor is to suggest that, but for a more 
democratic “citizen media,” history would have taken a much different course. 
16 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001); CASS SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS (2001); see also 
Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1785–87 (1995). 
17 SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBERS, supra note 16, at 5. 
18 See Federalist 10 (Madison), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 77 (CLINTON ROSSITER ed., 1961). 
19 William J. Clinton, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, The Gateway Computers 
European Facility, Santry County Dublin, “Remarks by the President to Business Leaders, and 
Officials and Employees of Gateway Computers,” Sept. 4, 1998, 
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980904-9108.html.   
20 See WU & GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at ch. 6; Benjamin L. Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?  
The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 82-91 (2005). 
21 Nicholas Kristof, Death By a Thousand Blogs, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005. 
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 In this article we come at these debates from a new angle by providing 
detailed evidence of what is actually happening in China.  What much of the 
present debate misses is what happens when speech becomes far cheaper, yet still 
not free -- where some forms of criticism are allowed, but not others.22  In our 
example of China, direct criticism of Party rule is off limits, yet critiques of the 
courts are more acceptable.  The consequence, as we’ll see, is a directed form of 
criticism whose social function is not well appreciated by our existing and 
dominant means of understanding speech.  
 This study is also an opportunity to examine the impact of focused 
criticism not on government in general, but on the courts specifically.  Previous 
writing in this area, focused on the media, has not devoted much attention to the 
intricate relationship between mass, inexpert participation, and the functioning of 
a legal system.   The American free speech caselaw does concede the need for 
restrictions on speech within the courts, and in exceptional cases for restrictions 
on media coverage of court proceedings, but the effects of cheaper speech on the 
judiciary itself are not as well understood.  There is a simple explanation for this.  
In the United States, the most obvious consequences of the internet revolution 
have been for the media and business.  Conversely, the operation of the judiciary 
has been far less affected.  This may reflect the American judiciary’s particular 
tradition of independence and relative isolation from the direct influence of public 
opinion.   Aside from better legal blogging, an occasional URL citation in 
Supreme Court opinions, and greater competition for Westlaw and Lexis, it may 
be that few of the decision-making methods of courts have changed.    
 But it is unsurprisingly that different countries are being differently 
affected by a major change in the costs of communications.  The effects of the 
internet on the Chinese legal system are arguably far more profound than in 
Europe or the United States.    Yet since these developments are largely not 
discussed in the West, we find ourselves writing on new ground, with regard to 
both China and the broader question of how new technologies may be affecting 
judicial decision-making.   
 
* * * 
 
 Judges are decision-makers, and to pursue the question of how 
information affects judging, the tools of information economics will prove useful.   
For that reason, we turn now to a review of some of the relevant literature on 
information-transmission and decision-making. 
 
B.  The Economics of Information and Decision-Making 
 
                                                 
22 For more general commentary on the impact of the internet, see Anupam Chandler, Whose 
Republic?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1479 (2002), Thomas S. Ulen, Democracy and the Internet, 2 J L 
TECH & POL 224 (2002); Mark S. Nadel, Customized News Services and Extremist Enclaves in 
Republic.com, 54 STAN L REV 831, 857 (2001).  
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 Fredrick Hayek’s 1945 work The Use of Knowledge in Society is a starting 
point for much of what has followed on the relevance of information to decision-
making.23  Hayek argued that the advantages of the free market over a planned 
economy were largely related to how a free market makes use of information.  
The free market, he pointed out, is not obviously more efficient than a centralized, 
planned production, since competition tends to be disorganized, duplicative, and 
wasteful.  Instead, said Hayek, the problem with models of centralized planning is 
informational: no single actor can possess sufficient information to make all the 
decisions necessary in a complex economy.  Conversely, the market’s 
decentralized decisions about production, while certainly prone to error and waste, 
are at least made on the basis of much more of the relevant information -- leading 
to, in the aggregate, better decision-making.   Market prices, in Hayek’s view, 
were valuable public information about resource scarcity that a centralized 
planner had difficulty replicating. 
 The study of decision-making given imperfect information has developed 
into an entire field since Hayek’s time, often called “information economics.” 24    
The tools of information economics are valuable for understanding the importance 
of communications within a legal system.    
 First, in the information economics literature, a major distinction is made 
between decision structures that are more horizontal or “polyarchical” in nature, 
and those that are more vertical, or “hierarchical.”25  That difference in decision 
structures is, for example, an essential difference between a planned and market 
economy.  Economists Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph Stiglitz originally focused on 
the differences between hierarchies and polyarchies for purposes of error-
correction. But other writers, including economist Jeremy Stein, write about the 
differences in information transmission in vertically -- and horizontally -- 
organized institutions.26 
                                                 
23 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).  
24 Since Hayek’s time the relationship between information-transmission and decision-making has 
received much attention, and only the briefest of summaries will be attempted.  Michael Spence, 
Joseph Stiglitz and others have developed the field of information economics, which emphasizes 
economic decision-making under conditions of imperfect information.  See generally, Joseph 
Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Nobel Prize Lecture, 
December 8, 2001.  That has led to work on information asymmetries as a form of market failure 
(and signaling as a remedy), the relative performance of decentralized and centralized decision 
makers, the phenomenon of “herding behavior,” and other interactions between information and 
the market.  See, e.g., Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems:  
Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 716 (1984); Raaj Sah & Joseph Stiglitz, The 
Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, Q. J. ECON. 289 (1991); 
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 113-125 (1992); 
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AMER. ECON. REV. 
465 (1990); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network, 109 
Q. J. ECON. 809 (1994).  Versions of these ideas have reached the public in widely-read works 
such as James Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of Crowds (2004).  
25 See Sah & Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems, supra note 24; Sah & Stiglitz, The 
Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, supra note 24. 
26 See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus 
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 One type of decentralized decision-making system of great interest is 
common-law courts.  First, Hayek himself in 1960 argued that the English legal 
system was a superior institution to the French, based on its decentralized 
decision-making.27  Later, Richard Posner described the common law litigation 
process as a source of rules -- and viewed judges as decentralized decision-makers 
acting on the basis of local information, whose collective decision-making might, 
over time, reach efficient results.28   The challenges to Posner’s thesis are well-
known.29  Nonetheless, the theory of common-law “learning” and the potential of 
moving toward better rules has been influential.30 
 A second and particularly useful tool from information economics is the 
theory of the “rational herd” or “information cascade.”  The herding literature is 
interested in the puzzles of mass behavior, like fashion trends, and mass mistakes, 
such as stock market bubbles or the tendency of mutual fund managers to under-
perform the market.  These theories model what happens when decision-makers 
weigh not only their own judgment, but the collective volume of the decisions of 
others. 31    The phenomenon of rational herding identifies situations where 
decisions are decreasingly driven by one’s own information, and increasingly 
driven by the actions of others. 
 The notion of rational herding has obvious implications for a legal system.  
The prospect is that judges may similarly, and rationally, herd around a bad or 
                                                                                                                                     
Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FIN. 1891, 1891–93 (2002) (arguing that information that might be 
easier to transmit, or “hard” information, like numbers,  can be handled well by a hierarchy, while 
“soft” information, such as a subjective assessment of managerial ability, might be better 
processed by decentralized actors). 
27 FREDRICH HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 194-196 (1960). 
28 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 320-28 (1st ed. 1973); Paul Rubin, Why is 
the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977);  George Priest, The Common Law 
Process and the Selection of Efficient Legal Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977). 
29 One obvious point is that judges who choose the wrong rules do not, like firms, go out of 
business, and few today seem to believe that all common-law rules are efficient.   See, e.g., Priest, 
supra note 28; Lewis Kornhauser, Some Notes on the Logic of Legal Change, in THE LOGIC OF 
SOCIAL CHANGE 169, 169 (D. BAYBROOKE ed., 1996); Gillian Hatfield, Bias in the Evolution of 
Legal Rules, 80 GEO. L. J. 583 (1992).  
30  Paul Mahoney, for example, has sought to demonstrate empirically that common law, 
precedent-based systems create faster economic growth than civil systems, with data showing, on 
average, slightly more than one-half a percent faster growth in the world’s common-law countries,  
during the period 1962-1990.  See Paul Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: 
Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503-525 (2001).  Mahoney “[controlled] for 
starting per capita GDP, secondary school enrollment, population growth, investment, and other 
factors.” Id. 
31 For example, imagine that Restaurants A and B serve similar quality food, and that ten people, 
who know nothing about the restaurants, arrive one by one.   The first sequential decision-maker 
D1 might decide, randomly, to go to restaurant B.   The next, D2, if he weights D1’s decision 
heavily, might make the same choice.  Over time, restaurant B may be full, a powerful signal of 
quality having nothing to do with the actual quality of the food.For a more in-depth overview, see 
Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others: 
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES  12:3  151-170 (Summer 
1998). 
11/10/06 Draft                           CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE                                         10 
  
suboptimal rule, yet due to the weight of cases behind the rule, be increasingly 
hesitant to run against the crowd.  Economists Andrew Daughety and Jennifer F. 
Reinganum, in their paper on horizontal judicial herding, gave the example of 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, where six circuit courts had agreed a law was 
constitutional but were later reversed by the Supreme Court.32   The example 
showed that, perhaps due to herding effects, errors might remain long uncorrected 
in a common-law system. 
 The prospect of judicial herding may seem like a serious challenge to the 
utility of a common-law system.  But as we discuss in Part III, doing what other 
judges have done in similar cases may also be desirable -- for it’s a means for 
judges to build their own political power.  Herding may also be another word for 
following a rule.33  As Eric Talley has written, healthy legal systems aim for a 
balance between blind obedience and learning.34   They employ devices, like life 
tenure, or the technique of distinguishing cases, that allow judges to break from 
sub-optimal rules when they deem it necessary. An ideal system ought 
simultaneously to provide predictability and the capacity to adapt, despite the 
apparent contradiction. 
 These tools from the information economics literature help us understand 
what’s at stake when we study communications within a judicial system. We now 
to turn our empirical study of recent developments in the communications 
practices in the Chinese judiciary. 
 
II.   CHINESE JUDGES AND THE INTERNET 
 
Before beginning our analysis of the impact of the internet on the courts, 
we offer a brief primer in the functioning of China’s courts and the Chinese 
media.35  China has a lot of judges—most estimates say about 200,000, or roughly 
twice the number of lawyers.  Until recently, relatively few Chinese judges had 
significant legal training:  reports in mid-2005 stated that, for the first time, more 
than fifty percent of judges were university graduates.  A decade earlier the figure 
was just twelve percent.  In the past, many judges were retired military officials or 
government cadres.  As of 2002, however, new judges are required to be 
university graduates and to pass the difficult national bar exam (which has a pass 
rate of about ten percent).  The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has also devoted 
enormous resources to training existing judges.  Many of those who lack formal 
training in law have been required to attend night-school or special training 
                                                 
32 Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence 
and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM L & ECON REV 158 (1999). 
33 See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U.L. REV. 813 (1998). 
34 See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999). 
35 This discussion is based on Liebman, Watchdog, supra note 20; Benjamin L Liebman, China’s 
Courts:  Restricted Reform, CHINA Q. (forthcoming 2007); and Benjamin L. Liebman, Innovation 
through Intimidation:  An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 47 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 33 (2006).  
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programs.  Older judges who lack legal training are being pushed into early 
retirement, or are sometimes no longer permitted to hear cases. 
 For much of the reform period (1978-present), China’s courts have 
remained relatively minor actors in the Chinese political system.  Courts lack 
significant power over other state institutions and have no formal powers of 
judicial review.  Under the Chinese Constitution, only the National People’s 
Congress and its Standing Committee have the power to interpret laws or the 
Constitution, though in practice the SPC plays an important role in interpreting 
the law. 
 China’s legal system is national and unitary, with four levels of courts.  
Most first instance cases are brought in basic level courts in counties or in districts 
within cities.  Appeals from such cases go to intermediate courts in municipalities, 
or shi.  Intermediate courts also hear certain categories of first instance cases -- 
generally those involving large sums of money, or serious crimes, but also 
sometimes cases that are politically sensitive.  Provincial high courts (and the 
high courts of municipalities with provincial rank, such as Beijing and Shanghai) 
oversee the courts in their provinces, hear appeals from intermediate courts, and 
have the power to rehear cases brought in all lower courts in their jurisdiction.  
The SPC, with more than 200 judges, manages the court bureaucracy, hears 
appeals and rehearings, and issues a large volume of interpretive documents 
intended to guide lower courts in the application of the law.  These range from 
formal interpretations of laws, which often read like statutes themselves, to 
responses to courts regarding the handling of individual cases pending in lower 
courts.   
 Court caseloads have grown significantly since the beginning of legal 
reforms in the late 1970s -- with some stating that China is now experiencing a 
“litigation explosion.”  Over the last five years the total number of cases heard in 
China, has held steady at about eight million a year.  Courts continue to be one of 
many state institutions with responsibility for resolving disputes and hearing 
grievances. 
Problems in the Chinese courts have received widespread attention in both 
the Chinese and international media.  Corruption is said to be common, courts 
often lack the power to enforce their decisions, and external intervention in 
pending cases is widespread.  Intervention comes from a range of sources. Local 
government officials frequently pressure the courts in cases involving key local 
interests.  Courts find it hard to resist such pressure, in particular because judges 
depend on local governments for their jobs and salaries.  Court appointments (and 
removals from office) are generally made by the local Communist Party branch 
and government, and court budgets are dependent on local governments.  
Communist Party Political-Legal Committees, which include senior police, court, 
procuratorate, justice bureau, and Party officials, exist at each level of the Party-
state, and discuss (and sometimes issue written suggestions in) major cases.  
People’s congresses -- China’s legislatures -- have the formal power to 
“supervise” the courts, and may from time to time issue requests or views to 
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courts regarding cases.  Individual Party officials also may intervene in cases of 
particular concern, issuing written instructions to the courts regarding pending 
cases, or sometimes simply discussing cases with court presidents.   
 In contrast to the courts, the Chinese media have long occupied a 
privileged position in the Chinese political system.  The media serve as both the 
mouthpiece and the “eyes and ears” of the Party -- not only writing public reports 
that appear in print or in broadcasts, but also “internal reports.”  Internal reports 
contain information for officials of a particular rank, reports that are deemed not 
suitable for public dissemination.  This means that when media views conflict 
with those in the courts, Party officials tend to side with the media. 
 Commercialization of the Chinese media in the 1990s resulted in major 
changes.  Thousands of new publications appeared, mostly offshoots of traditional 
Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers.  These commercialized papers 
compete fiercely with one another, often by providing sensational or hard-hitting 
reports. They also generate profits for their parent publications, which continue in 
their “official” or “mouthpiece” propaganda roles.  The growth of the internet 
brought further competition, with papers and web portals now competing to 
attract readers on-line as well as in-print, often by providing content that skirts the 
edges of what is permissible. 
China’s media regulatory system, although challenged by the growth of 
commercialized media and the internet, remains fundamentally unchanged.  
Regulations restrict who can enter the market -- ensuring that the overwhelming 
majority of publications and broadcasters in China are state-controlled (albeit 
often in corporatized form).   The Party’s Central Propaganda Department 
(“CPD”) oversees all media content, relying on both circulars that prohibit certain 
content, and also on a system of post-publication sanctions that target those who 
go beyond permissible boundaries.  Local propaganda departments at the 
provincial, municipal, and local level likewise oversee content in local media, 
often supplementing CPD restrictions with their own local restrictions on content.   
The job of the CPD and local and provincial propaganda departments has 
become much more difficult in recent years.  The commercialization of the media 
means that there is vastly more content available than at any prior point in 
Chinese history.  And the growth of the internet, as we will show, means that 
news spreads much more quickly than before -- often before propaganda 
departments can react to impose bans.  Chinese authorities have not been passive 
in response to such challenges.  As has been widely reported in the western media, 
China devotes substantial resources to monitoring and controlling the internet.  
This includes ordering websites to prohibit discussion of certain topics, or to 
remove controversial articles.  Sites that go too far are shut.  One result is that 
self-censorship by commercial internet news providers is perhaps the most 
effective means by which authorities maintain control over reporting and 
discussion of controversial topics online. 
 The following sections set forth our empirical findings.  They are based on 
extensive review of Chinese writings and on interviews with more than 100 
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scholars, reporters, lawyers, and judges about the impact of the internet on 
China’s courts.   Interviews with judges were conducted in three provinces in 
China and in two cities with provincial rank.  Judges ranged from those sitting on 
provincial high courts, to well-educated judges in major cities, to judges in small 
county towns who lacked formal training in law. 36   We freely admit the 
limitations of our methodology:  those likely to interact with us are most likely 
younger, more liberal, and more likely to use the internet, than many others in 
China.  Nevertheless, their descriptions of the impact of the internet provide a 
crucial base for understanding the important changes we believe are taking place 
in China’s courts. 
 
A.  External Pressures 
 
 China’s own internet revolution has made it much easier for the public, the 
media, and the Party-state to become aware of and criticize the Chinese legal 
system and its courts.   Although that may sound good, the results, from a rule-of-
law perspective, have both attractive and less attractive aspects.    
 Sometimes cheaper information has meant better accountability and 
pressure for important reform.  As we discuss below, courts or legal institutions 
that are neglecting or deliberately abusing their duties can be exposed and 
subjected to public or media pressure.   Bad decisions, corrupt judges, and unjust 
procedures are sometimes brought to light by internet communications, leading to 
important reforms. 
  Yet the same mechanism can create excessive pressure on the courts.  As 
we discuss, unpopular decisions can attract a strong public reaction — the 
“internet manhunt” — and subsequent political intervention to quell public 
outrage.  The internet plays a crucial role in making both Party leadership and the 
courts aware of public opinion, which is important in a system in which other 
outlets for public opinion are restricted.   But the effect may be more mixed in a 
system where only one segment of public opinion is being heard, where the media 
play an active role in generating popular outrage online, and when such opinion is 
significantly restricted due to Communist Party control and oversight of the media. 
1.  Greater Accountability. -- In 2003, Sun Zhigang, a university graduate 
working as a graphic designer in the southern city of Guangzhou, was detained by 
police for failing to have the temporary residence permits required of migrant 
workers.   Three days after his arrest Sun was beaten to death while in a local 
detention center for migrants.37 
 More than a month after Sun’s killing, on April 25, 2003, the leading 
commercial newspaper in Guangdong Province, Southern Metropolitan Daily, 
carried a report on the case, entitled “Only Missing a Temporary Residence 
                                                 
36  All interviews were conducted by Liebman.  All interviewees were promised complete 
anonymity, and thus we identify neither their name nor the location in which the interviews took 
place. 
37 For details of the case see Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20, at 82-91 (2005). 
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Permit, College Graduate is Beaten to Death.”  Local Communist Party 
Propaganda Department officials immediately banned any further discussion of 
the case in the local media.  But the ban was ineffective.  The Southern 
Metropolitan Daily article had already been posted to the paper’s web site on the 
day of publication, and had been subsequently reposted to numerous other internet 
web sites.   It even showed up on the web site of the People’s Daily, the 
mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party. 
 Within hours, internet discussion forums filled with discussion of the 
case. 38   Noting the article in the Party’s People’s Daily, numerous other 
newspapers subsequently reported on the case, carrying follow-up stories that 
were also posted and reposted online.   On May 13, three weeks after the original 
report and following weeks of online discussion of the case, authorities 
announced that they had detained thirteen suspects.  A month later, twelve 
defendants were convicted for their roles in the case, and the two “primary 
culprits” were sentenced to death and life in prison, respectively.39 
 The impact of the case -- and of the internet -- did not end with the trial.  
Following the arrests in May, a group of academics and journalists launched an 
assault on the detention system under which Sun had been apprehended, known as 
Custody and Repatriation.  In an effort coordinated with print and online media, 
two groups of lawyers and scholars issued petitions calling on the system to be 
abolished because it was unconstitutional.  The petitions themselves were not 
printed in full in the official media, but were widely available online.40  Media 
                                                 
38  Nanfang Zhoumo: Renmin Wang Wenzhang Zengjia Le Zhenpo Sun Zhigang An De Juexin 
[Southern Weekend: Articles on People’s Daily Online Strengthens the Determination to Crack 
the Sun Zhigang Case], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], June 6, 2003, available at 
http://past.people.com.cn/GB/news/8410/20030606/1010138.html (discussing the internet’s role in 
the case) [LZ-36]; Zhongguo Zhi Sheng: Sun Zhigang Shijian [The Voice of China: The Sun 
Zhigang Affair], Human Rights Watch, 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china/beijing08/voices_ch.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (stating 
that tens of thousands of postings protesting the case appeared, on all popular websites in China, 
and including examples of such postings) [LZ-37]; see also Teng Biao, Sun Zhigang Shijian: 
Zhishi, Meijie Yu Quanli [The Sun Zhigang Affair: Intelligence, Media and Power], FALÜ SIXIANG 
WANG [LAW THINKER WEB], Oct. 25, 2004, http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=2703 [LZ-39] 
(describing online discussions of the case and the important role of the internet).   
39 In addition, twenty-three officials were given administrative sanctions for their mishandling of 
the case. 
40 For discussion of the petitions, see Guo Liang, Zhongguo Hulianwang De Fazhan: Dongli Yiji 
Dui Minyi De Yingxiang [The Development of Internet in China: Dynamics and Influence on 
Public Opinion], Zhongguo Hulianwang Yanjiu Xiangmu [China Internet Research Project], Apr. 
26, 2004, http://www.wipchina.org/?p1=content&p2=05013000345 [LZ-34]; Teng Biao, [LZ-39], 
supra note 38; Cui Li, Wu Zhuanjia Jiu Sun Zhigang An Tiqing Renda Qidong Tebie Diaocha 
Chengxu [Five Experts Petitions to the NPC to Initiate Special Investigation Proceedings], 
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], May 28, 2003, available at 
http://www.npcnews.com.cn/gb/paper7/30/class000700001/hwz236693.htm [LZ-41]; San 
Gongmin Shangshu Renda Jianyi Dui Shourong Banfa Jinxing Weixian Shencha [Three Citizens 
Petition to the NPC Calling for Constitutional Review of the Custody and Repatriation Provisions], 
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA YOUTH DAILY], May 16, 2003, available at 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/20030516/993964.html [LZ-40].  
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coverage highlighted their demands, leading to online discussion and reposting of 
the petition.41  Reports also noted some of the widespread abuses in the system, 
including numerous reports of other inmates also being murdered while in 
detention.  Websites provided significantly wider-ranging discussions of the case 
than those appearing in the traditional media.42 
 Shortly after the June trial of the defendants in the Sun case, China’s State 
Council announced that the Custody and Repatriation System was being scrapped 
and replaced with a system designed to shift the emphasis from punishing 
migrants to assisting them by establishing “a caring assistance system” of “aid 
stations” that provide migrants with shelter and food. 43   Although official 
comments stated that the changes simply reflected changed conditions in China 
and some involved in the drafting of the new regulations noted that the changes 
had been contemplated since before the incident, the link to the Sun Zhigang case 
and ensuing public outcry was clear. 
 The Sun Zhigang case is an example of how the growth of investigative 
journalism in China, in particular among the market-driven newspapers that 
developed throughout the 1990s, combined with the internet, is resulting in much 
greater attention to law and the legal system than at any prior point in Chinese 
history.44  Prior to commercialization of the media, press reports on the courts 
tended to be declaratory statements of the outcomes of cases, often written by 
court officials.  Increased competition among the print media brought greater 
scrutiny to the courts and to legal issues more generally, along with greater 
critical coverage of decisions perceived as unjust.  Yet prior to the growth of the 
internet, discussions of cases in one region, even in the commercialized media, 
often went unnoticed elsewhere, and it was relatively easy for Propaganda 
Department officials to terminate discussion of cases by banning further media 
reports.  A daring newspaper, such as Southern Weekend, might expose gross 
injustice, but officials could move swiftly to terminate follow-up reports.  
Otherwise, courts often operated in relative obscurity.  Decisions might be 
reported in a local newspaper, or not at all. 
                                                 
41  For discussion of the internet’s role in the case, see  Ouyang Bin, Hulianwang Chongji 
Zhongguo Shehui Shengtai [Internet’s Impact on the Environment of Chinese Society], Fenghuang 
Wang [Phoenix TV Net], available at 
http://www.phoenixtv.com.cn/home/phoenixweekly/141/30page.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2006) 
[LZ-31]; Guo Liang [LZ-34], supra note 40. 
42 For example, a well-known Peking University professor engaged in a pointed two-hour online 
discussion on the case; the transcript is available at He Weifang, Cong Sun Zhigang Shijian Kan 
Zhongguo Fazhi Fazhan [Development of Rule of Law in China as Reflected by the Sun Zhigang 
Affair], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], June 10, 2003, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/46/20030610/1013342.html[LZ-42]. 
43 670,000 Urban Vagrants Get Assistance in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 23, 2004, 
available at http://english.people.com.cn/200412/23/eng20041223_168443.html;  Vagrants Get 
Aid as New System Begins in China, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Aug. 1, 2003, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/200308/01/eng20030801_121435.shtml. 
44  For discussion of the development of the commercialized media in China and the rise of 
investigative journalism, see Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 20, at 23-41 
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  That’s changing.  As the Sun case shows, thanks mainly to the internet 
and the birth of competing internet news sites, cases that might once have been 
invisible, or have disappeared, can receive national attention, sometimes virtually 
instantly.  In other cases, web sites and web discussion forums spread news of 
cases where local Propaganda Department officials have instructed the official 
media not to report on such cases.  In addition to the famous Sun Zhigang case, 
numerous other cases of alleged injustice have attracted widespread coverage and 
discussion on the internet.  We now discuss two additional examples, the 
wrongful convictions of She Xianglin and Nie Shubin.  
 In 1994 a woman named Zhang Zaiyu disappeared.  Zhang’s family 
accused her husband, She Xianglin, of killing her.  When police found the body of 
an unidentified woman in a nearby water tower, which relatives identified as 
Zhang, they charged She with murder.  After She confessed to the murder, 
allegedly under torture, he was sentenced to death.  On appeal the Hubei Province 
High People’s Court sent the case back for retrial due to insufficient evidence, and 
She was sentenced to 15 years in prison for intentional homicide.45      
Eleven years later, on March 28, 2005, Zhang Zaiyu reappeared alive and 
married to a different man.46  An initial report on Zhang’s reappearance ran in a 
local paper in Wuhan, the capital of Hubei Province.  Following the report, local 
authorities banned further reporting on the case pending an official investigation, 
and instructed the media to use only an officially approved report on the case.47  
But news quickly spread online and to other newspapers.  A few weeks later, on 
April 15, She was released from custody. Media coverage may not have been 
solely responsible for She being freed -- authorities reopened the case 
immediately after Zhang returned home.  But such coverage did appear to assist 
She in obtaining 460,000 yuan (approximately 57,000 U.S. dollars) in 
compensation for his wrongful incarceration.  The settlement was reported to be 
the largest from the state in Chinese history.48 
As in the Sun Zhigang case, the media linked the case to broader problems 
in the Chinese criminal justice system.  One report on the She case argued such 
wrongful conviction cases reflected the pressure placed on local authorities to 
solve cases and assuage popular anger. 49   Official explanations, in contrast, 
blamed the case on historical circumstances and the weakness of the legal system 
                                                 
45 Cong Nie Shubin Dao She Xianglin: Cuoan Zhaoxue Buneng Jiwang Yu Ouran [From Nie 
Shubin to She Xianglin: Correcting Wrongful Convictions Cannot Rely Only on Chance], Apr. 3, 
2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-04/03/content_2779236.htm[LP-35]. 
46 Id. [LP-35]. 
47 See Lü Zongshu, Jizhe Diaocha: She Xianglin “Sha Qi” Cuo An [Journalist’s Investigation: 
The Wrongful Conviction of She Xianglin for “Killing his Wife”], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE], July 27, 2005, http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/47850/47855/3572767.html 
[LZ-44]. 
48 Hu Bing & Yan Hua, She Xianglin Nadao 46 Wan Peichang He Buchang Kuan [She Xianglin 
Obtains 460,000 Yuan in Compensation], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Sept. 
3, 2005, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=176316 [LP-38]. 
49 From Nie Shubin to She Xianglin [LP-35], supra note 45. 
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at the time of She’s conviction, and praised the efforts of local authorities to 
resolve the matter.50 
Another illustrative example is the wrongful conviction case of Nie 
Shubin.  In 1994, a court in Hebei Province found Nie Shubin guilty of rape and 
murder.  Nie was executed the following year.  Eleven years later, in 2005, a 
second man named Wang Shujin confessed to the original rape and murder.   
The confession story was originally reported on in March by a reporter 
from the Henan Commercial News, reprinted in the Beijing News and followed-up 
on by a report in Southern Weekend.51  All of the reports subsequently were 
posted to and circulated online.  Local authorities refused to reopen Nie’s case, 
and the media began to complain of a cover-up.  A report in Southern Weekend, 
for example, asked why the local authorities failed to release details of their 
investigation into the case, and inquired whether the case would “disappear.”52  
The report also noted that all details about the case had been removed from the 
police website.53  Likewise, a report in the Beijing News, issued on March 15, 
questioned why the police, procuratorate, and court involved in the case had 
refused to take any action or to comment on the case.54  Following the report, 
propaganda department officials apparently ordered the media not to carry further 
reports on the case.55 However, reports continued to circulate, both in print and 
online, suggesting that the ban was either very limited or was widely ignored.56   
                                                 
50  Jingmen Shouci Gongkai Zongjie She Xianglin An Jiaoxun: Youzui Tuiding Shi Shouyin 
[Jingmen for the First Time Summarizes Publicly the Lessons from the She Xianglin Case: The 
Crucial Reason is the Presumption of Guilt], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA WEB], July 19, 2005, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2005-07/19/content_3239399.htm [LP-36]. 
51 “Nie Shubin Yuansha An” Xuan Er Wei Jue, Fang “Goudui” Gongzhong Yu Yidi Diaocha 
[“The Case of Nie Shubin’s Wrongful Execution” is Pending, and the Public Calls Out for an 
External Investigation in Order to Avoid “Compromising”], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN 
WEEKEND], Mar. 24, 2005, http://www.southcn.com/weekend/commend/200503240006.htm [LZ-
57].  
52 Zhao Ling, Nie Shubin An Juedui Buhui Bu Liao Liao Zhi [Nie Shubin Case Will Absolutely Not 
End Up With No Outcome], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKEND], Apr. 28, 2005, available 
at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ZM/20050428/xw/fz/200504280005.asp [LP-41]. 
53 Previously, the Guangpin county public security web site had included details of the case in a 
prominent place. Id. [LP-41]. 
54 Wugu Qingnian 10 Nian Qian Zao Cuo Sha? [An Innocent Youth Was Executed Wrongfully 10 
Years Ago?], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], Mar. 15, 2005, available at 
http://news.hexun.com/detail.aspx?lm=1697&id=1068197[LZ-49]; see also Zhao Ling, 
[LP-41], supra note 52; “Nie Shubin An” Geng Xuyao Gongzhong Haobu Songxie De Jinmi 
Guanzhu [“Nie Shubin Case” Needs More of the Public’s Continuing and Intense Attention], 
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN NEWS], Apr. 22, 2005, available at 
http://www.southcn.com/opinion/politics/200504220359.htm (discussing the case) [LP-42].   
55 Zhongxuanbu Jinji Tongzhi Jinzhi Baodao Nie Shubin Bei Cuosha An [The Central Propaganda 
Department Urgently Circulates Notice Banning Reports of the Case of Nie Shubin’s Wrongful 
Execution], BOXUN XINWEN WANG [BOXUN NEWSNET], Mar. 21, 2005, 
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2005/03/200503211409.shtml [LZ-51]; Fu Yingji, 2005 
Nian Zhongguo Wangluo Shier Da Bei Shan Xinwen [Twelve Big Pieces of News Deleted from the 
Chinese Internet in 2005], available at http://forum.chinesenewsnet.com/archive/index.php/t-
19858.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) and 
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On the same day the Beijing News report appeared, the Hebei Province 
High People’s Court launched an investigation into the case.  The Court did so 
after written instruction from leaders of the Political-Legal Committee of the 
Provincial Communist Party.57 Although rumors later circulated online that an 
internal investigation had determined that the case had not been incorrectly 
decided,58 as of mid-2006 no official decision had been announced.59   
Nie Shubin’s family may still be waiting for justice.  But, as with the Sun 
Zhigang case, the most important effect of the Nie and She cases was not the 
outcome of the individual cases, but their effect on national policy.  At the end of 
2005, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) announced that it was revising 
China’s procedures for handling capital cases.  Under the new rules, final review 
of all capital cases will be conducted by the SPC.  In the past, such review power 
was delegated to provincial high courts -- which were also responsible for hearing 
appeals of capital cases.  The new procedures create a third tier of review.  In 
addition, the SPC rules require appeals in capital cases to be heard in open court.60     
Although pressure, both domestic and international, had been building for such 
changes for some time, the wave of public attention to the Nie, She, and other 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.wangbingzhang.us/forum/wbz/messages/4381.html [LZ-59]. The two sources that 
reported on the ban are overseas media, and may have overstated the reach of the ban. Although 
both reports stated that the CPD had imposed a ban, it appears more likely that any ban was 
imposed by local, not national, propaganda department officials.  For a collection of commentary 
on the case, see Xiao Han, Guanzhu Nie Shubin Mengyuan Sixing An [Pay Attention to Nie 
Shubin’s Wrongly Adjudicated Death Penalty Case], ZHONG PIN WANG [CHINA REVIEW WEB], 
Mar. 22, 2004, http://www.china-review.com/tbzt/050322bianzhean.htm [LZ-60].  
56 The Case of Nie Shubin Killed Wrongfully is Pending, [LZ-57], supra note 51; Zhao Ling, [LP-
41] supra note 52; Qian Haoping, Hebei Chongxin Diaocha Nie Shubin An, Cheng Zuiduan 
Shijian Nei Huan Shishi Zhenxiang [Hebei Re-investigates the Nie Shubin Case, Stating They will 
Reveal the Truth in the Shortest Time Possible], HEXUN YAOWEN [HEXUN CRITICAL NEWS], Mar. 
18, 2005, http://news.hexun.com/detail.aspx?lm=1716&id=1073687 [LZ-50].  
57 Qian Haoping [LZ-50], supra note 56. 
58 Hebei Zuochu Nie Shubin An “Bushi Cuoan” De Rending [Hebei Makes Determination that the 
Nie Shubin Case “Was Not Wrongfully Decided”], BOXUN XINWEN WANG [BOXUN NEWSNET], 
Apr. 22, 2005,  
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2005/04/200504220259.shtml [LZ-52]. 
59  Nanfang Dushi Bao: Feiyao Zhaoqi Nie An De Yuanshi Xingzhen Jilu Ma [Southern 
Metropolitan Daily: Are All the Original Administrative Records of Nie Case Required], 
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Jan. 7, 2006, available at 
http://news.163.com/06/0107/01/26R26J510001124T.html [LZ-53]. One report stated that the 
family of Nie Shubin had heard that officials had determined that there was no error, but had not 
received any formal notification to this effect. “‘Nie Shubin Qiangjian Sharen An’ Bushi Cuoan” 
[“‘The Nie Shubin Rape and Murder Case’ Was Not Wrongfully Decided”], GUANGZHOU RIBAO 
[GUANGZHOU DAILY], Apr. 20, 2005, available at http://gzdaily.dayoo.com/gb/content/2005-
04/20/content_2023768.htm [LZ-61].  
60 Yearender:  Media’s Frequent Exposure of Unjust Cases Promotes Judicial Reform, PEOPLE’S 
DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2005, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/19/eng20051219_229034.html. 
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wrongful conviction cases during 2005 appeared to be a crucial factor leading the 
SPC to make the changes.61 
Most such cases follow a pattern similar to those of the Sun, She and Nie 
cases.  Traditional print media initially report on the case, the report is posted to 
the media’s official web page, and then is reposted to numerous other websites.  
The articles result in widespread discussion online, in particular in web discussion 
forums.62  Such discussion and coverage encourages follow-up reports in the print 
media, reports that are subsequently reposted to the internet.  
The interaction between print and online media is important.  Chinese 
regulations on the internet restrict the ability of internet providers to create their 
own news content.   With just a few exceptions, only traditional media are 
permitted to generate news stories.63  The number of web sites legally qualified to 
print original news is unclear; a 2004 report stated that 163 web sites were legally 
qualified to publish news, while another 1400 were permitted to offer “news 
service” -- which generally means they are permitted to reprint articles that have 
already appeared in the official media.64  Websites with the ability to generate 
original news content are generally those linked to national, provincial and local 
Communist Party mouthpiece newspapers. 65   Another important difference 
between the traditional media and online media is that the online media are more 
likely to carry commentaries on cases while they are pending.  The traditional 
media usually wait to discuss cases until decisions have been made.66 
An additional crucial feature of the Sun, She and Nie cases is that the 
internet facilitates coverage by the media in jurisdictions other than those in 
                                                 
61 Fazhi Ribao: Dianji 2005 Nian Si Da Falü Guanjian Ci [Legal Daily: Clicking on Four Key 
Legal Words in the Year 2005], Jan. 10, 2006, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-01-
10/08317940186s.shtml (discussing the effect of the Nie and She cases) [LZ-58]. 
62 In some cases in which initial reports in the official media are blocked, information on the cases 
is first posted to web sites.  Once sufficient public discussion has been generated, and official 
attitudes toward the case have become clear, the official media will then report on the case.  
Ouyang Bin [LZ-31], supra note 41.   
63 Hulianwang Xinwen Xinxi Fuwu Guanli Guiding [Provisions for the Administration of Internet 
News Information Services], Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi, Xinxi Chanye Bu Di 37 Hao Ling 
[The Information Office of the State Council and the Ministry of Information, Industry Order No. 
37] (Sept. 25, 2005), available at 
http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=60145 [LZ-46] (stating 
that only web sites linked to traditional media are permitted to generate their own news stories); 
Hulian Wangzhan Congshi Dengzai Xinwen Yewu Guanli Zanxing Guiding [Temporary 
Provisions for the Administration of Internet Websites’ Service of Posting News Information], 
Guowuyuan Xinwen Bangongshi & Xinxi Chanye Bu [The Information Office of the State 
Council & the Ministry of Information Industry], Nov. 7, 2000, available at 
http://info.people.com.cn/EComClnt/index2.jsp [LZ-47]. 
64  Shi Jiangmin, “Wangluo Chuanbo” Zai Jing Zhengshi Chuangkan [“Internet Broadcast” 
Officially Published in Beijing], RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], April 20, 2004, 
available at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14677/14737/22035/2458358.html [LZ-
48]. 
65 Id. (listing examples); Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20. 
66 Interview 2006-26. 
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which a case occurred.   In the Nie case, what might have been a local issue was 
reported by media from Beijing, Henan, and Guangdong.  The significance lies in 
the fact that in many cases local propaganda authorities will block local media 
from reporting on local cases. 67 
Another, recent example of such trans-provincial news coverage is the  
defamation action brought against the authors of the best-selling -- but 
subsequently banned -- book, An Investigation into China’s Peasants.    The book 
detailed problems facing China’s peasants, including abuse and over-taxation by 
local authorities.   A Party official in Anhui Province sued the publisher and 
author in local court, arguing that the book had defamed him.68  After an initial 
flurry of coverage in the print media, the Central Propaganda Department banned 
further reporting on the case.69  Despite the ban, widespread discussion of the case 
continued online -- putting the court under pressure not to act too obviously to 
protect the local official.  Continued internet postings also highlighted the court’s 
ongoing failure to resolve the case.70   
 The Investigation into China’s Peasants case has yet to be resolved, and 
the long delay suggests that the court either continues to struggle to determine 
how to handle the case, or has decided to ignore it. 71   According to a widely 
circulated email written by the defendants’ lawyer in April 2006, the court 
handling the case has decided to leave the case unresolved and not issue any 
decision. But it does appear that the continued attention to the case, in part via 
online media, resulted in pressure on the court to follow procedural norms and not 
to act immediately to protect local interests.   
 The Sun, She and Nie cases show how the combined efforts of traditional 
and online media can force authorities to reopen cases and redress longstanding 
injustices.  Meanwhile, the Investigation into China’s Peasants case shows how 
                                                 
67 In mid-2005, China’s Central Propaganda Department issued new rules restricting “non-local 
news.”  The rules, which ban local media from writing original news content on other jurisdictions 
in China, is apparently a direct response to the widespread practice of non-local media engaging in 
investigative reporting.  Nailene Chou Wiest, Closing of Loopholes to Further Gag Media, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (Online), June 11, 2005, available at 
http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=25640 .  
68 Ruo Qiao, “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” Beigao Mingyu Qinquan Yuanshu Zuozhe Jujue 
Tingwai Hejie [Authors of “Investigation into China’s Peasants” Are Sued for Defamation and 
Refuse to Settle Out of Court], CHENGDU SHANG BAO [CHENGDU COMMERCIAL NEWS], Feb. 25, 
2004, available at http://www.booktide.com/news/20040225/200402250013.html [LZ-62]. 
69 Lianghui Qian Beijing Yankong Yulun Fengsha “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” [Beijing Tightly 
Controls the Media before the Two Meetings, Bans “Investigation into China’s Peasants”] 
BOXUN XINWEN WANG [BOXUN NEWSNET], Feb. 29, 2004, 
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/02/200402291359.shtml [LZ-63]. 
70  Bentai Dujia Huode “Zhongguo Nongmin Diaocha” An Bianhu Lüshi Pu Zhiqiang Zhi 
Shenpanzhang Yi Xin [Exclusive: Letter to the Chief Judge from Pu Zhiqiang, Lawyer for the 
Defendants in the “Investigation into China’s Peasants” Case], Radio Free Asia, July 11, 2005, 
available at http://www.rfa.org/mandarin/shenrubaodao/2005/07/11/puzhiqiang/  [LZ-64].  
71 Chinese courts encountering difficult or sensitive cases frequently either refuse to allow such 
cases to be filed, or simply never decide such cases.  For a discussion of the phenomenon, see 
Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35. 
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online media may help keep discussion alive when traditional media are barred 
from such discussions, and how email can be used to spread news of cases where 
reporting has been banned.  
2.  Internet Populism. -- In the Sun Zhigang case, public pressure led to 
more attention to the treatment of migrants within China.  Media pressure, fanned 
by internet discussion, forced authorities to investigate the case, make arrests, and 
abolish the detention system that led to his death.  The case may have resulted in 
belated justice for Sun.  But it was less clear that those accused of being his killers 
received fair trials.  Public pressure resulted in rushed and closed trials of the 
defendants, with court judgments that appeared preordained by Party leaders.  The 
trial in the case was held in June 2003, just six weeks after the case first came to 
light.  The Guangdong Province High People’s Court affirmed the lower court’s 
decision in the case on June 27, and Qiao Yanqin, the principal defendant, was 
executed the same day.72   
Only three official media outlets were permitted to send reporters to the 
trial. Propaganda officials instructed other media to use only reports from the 
official Xinhua News Agency, and Internet portals were told to terminate 
discussion of the case.  Some journalists and other observers questioned the 
fairness of the trial, arguing that the death sentence imposed on Qiao Yanqin was 
excessive, and asked why charges had focused on a low-ranking nurse and other 
inmates in the detention center, rather than on higher-ranking officials.  But such 
discussions were generally not permitted online or in print.  Instead, official 
accounts focused on praising authorities’ speedy handling of the case, and on the 
court’s responsiveness to public opinion.73   And in a final development, the 
editors of the paper that originally broke the story of Sun Zhigang’s murder were 
later imprisoned, albeit for “unrelated” corruption charges. 74 
 In 2003, Liu Yong likewise found that angry online discussion of a case 
can lead to execution.   Liu, an organized crime boss, was convicted in the early 
2000s of a range of crimes, including organizing a criminal syndicate, bribery, 
and illegal possession of firearms.75  An intermediate court in Liaoning Province 
                                                 
72 Sun Zhigang An Zhongshen Weichi Yuanpan, Zhufan Qiao Yanqin Bei Zhixing Sixing [Final 
Decision of Sun Zhigang Case Affirms the First Trial Decision: Principal Criminal is Executed], 
RENMIN WANG [PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE], June 27, 2003, 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/1939883.html [LZ-43]. 
73 See, e.g., Gong An Bu: Sun Zhigang Anjian De Chuli Shi Xunsu, Jianjue He Yansu De [The 
Ministry of Public Security: The Resolution of Sun Zhigang Case is Speedy, Determined and 
Serious], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NEWS], Aug. 7, 2003, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/weekend/2003-08/07/content_1016300.htm [LZ-54].  
74  Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue, supra note 20.  The same newspaper, Southern 
Metropolitan News, had also been the first to report on the SARS epidemic in 2003.  Observers 
suggested that the editors were punished for their coverage of both the Sun case and the SARS 
crisis. 
75 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zaishen Liu Yong An Xingshi Panjue Shu (2003) Xing Ti Zi Di 5 Hao 
[Supreme People’s Court Decision in the Retrial of the Liu Yong Criminal (2003) Criminal Retrial 
No. 5], Dec. 20, 2003, available at 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=96393 [LZ-55]. 
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tried his case and sentenced him to death.  On appeal in 2003, however, the 
Liaoning High People’s Court reduced his sentence to life in prison.  One reason 
for the reduction was the fact that Liu’s confession had been obtained through 
torture.76   
 A Shanghai paper, Bund Pictorial, quickly questioned the reduction in 
sentence.77   News of the court’s decision spread rapidly online -- one major 
internet portal ran a headline on its news home page, stating in large font “Liu 
Yong Will Not Die.”   The media suggested that Liu’s ties to officials in Liaoning 
Province resulted in favorable treatment.78   Reporters criticized academics who 
had written expert opinions -- in return for sizable fees — in support of Liu.79  
Web discussion forums filled with angry commentary, denouncing Liu’s “lenient” 
treatment. 
Following the public outcry, the Supreme People’s Court decided to 
rehear the case.  The Court invoked a rarely-used procedure that permits the court 
to try de novo questionably-decided cases.80  In a carefully scripted trial, Liu’s 
case was heard on a Friday.  The court announced its decision -- reinstating the 
death penalty -- on the following Monday morning.  Liu was executed the same 
morning.    
                                                 
76 The court stated that it had reduced the sentence in light of the facts and circumstances of the 
case, and noted that torture could not be ruled out.  The Provincial High Court Opinion is not 
publicly available, but the decision is summarized in the SPC’s opinion.   
77 Waitan Huabao: Dui Shenyang Heibang Toumu Liu Yong Gaipan Sihuan De Zhiyi [Bund 
Pictorial: Questions on the Gang Leader Liu Yong’s Reduced Sentence of Death with Reprieve], 
WAITAN HUABAO [BUND PICTORIAL], Aug. 21, 2003, available at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-
08-21/01351583471.shtml [LZ-LY6].  
78 Shenyang Heibang Laoda Liu Yong Heyi Ruci Xiaozhang, Gandie Ganma Houtai Ying [Why Is 
the Shenyang Gang Leader Liu Yong So Aggressive: He has Godparents as Strong Backup], 
SANLIAN SHENGHUO ZHOUKAN [SANLIAN LIFE WEEKLY], Mar. 8, 2001, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/202847.html [LZ-LY7]. 
79  Falü Zhuanjia Lunzheng Ganrao Sifa Gongzheng, Jixing Zhidu Chansheng Guaitai [Legal 
Experts’ Analyze Interference in Judicial Justice, Monster Baby is Born By the Malformed System], 
NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Oct. 9, 2003, available at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-09/11591884089.shtml [LZ-LY3]. In an online discussion 
forum on the case one posting claimed that each expert earned 300,000 yuan for writing in support 
of Liu Yong.  The experts denied this.  One of them told journalists that they received only 2000 
yuan each.  Id. [LZ-LY3]  
80 Pursuant to the tishen, or “elevation and trial” procedures, the SPC can rehear cases decided by 
lower courts even absent a request from the parties that they do so.  One report stated that the case 
was the “first ordinary criminal case” in which the SPC had used the procedures; one prior known 
tishen case was the trial of the Gang of Four. Gaofa Tishen Liu Yong You Liang Da Yuanyin, 
Zhuanjia Cheng Ci Tixian Fazhi Jinbu [Two Reasons for the SPC to Retry the Liu Yong Case, 
Experts Claim It Reflects Major Progress in the Legal System], BEIJING WANBAO [BEIJING 
EVENING NEWS], Dec. 17, 2003, available at 
http://news.sohu.com/2003/12/17/81/news217048181.shtml [LZ-LY1]; Zuigao Yuan Jinri Tishen 
“Liu Yong An”, Liang Da Xuannian Youdai Jiekai [SPC Retries the Liu Yong Case Today, Two 
Big Questions are Waiting to be Resolved], BEIJING CHENBAO [BEIJING MORNING POST], Dec. 18, 
2003, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-12/18/content_1236925.htm [LY-10]. 
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Media outlets and some academics described the decision as an 
appropriate response to popular opinion.81  Various web sites carried morbidly 
detailed accounts of each step of the case -- including, on the date of Liu’s 
judgment and execution, hourly reports that described the court judgment, 
transportation of Liu to the execution ground and his body to the crematorium, 
and then return of his ashes to his family.82  The sina.com page on the case 
included links to more than 100 articles and commentaries.83  Some declared the 
case a victory for “public opinion.”84   
The official media hailed the Liu Yong and Sun Zhigang cases as 
examples of successful official responses to public demands demonstrating 
China’s progress toward a more just and democratic society.  Yet subsequent 
cases also demonstrate that the Party propaganda officials have become 
increasingly conscious of the need to manage online discussion of cases, and not 
let public outrage go too far.  In two high-profile cases the authorities went out of 
their way to demonstrate that public outrage expressed online would not 
necessarily affect or change court decisions.  
 What became known as the BMW case began in 2003, when, in the 
northeast city of Harbin, a peasant accidentally drove his onion-cart into a parked 
BMW.   The driver, a woman named Su Xiuwen, got out, and argued with the 
driver of the onion cart, Dai Yiquan.   After bystanders intervened, she retreated 
to the car.  She then unexpectedly put the car into gear, striking and killing Liu 
Zhongxai, Dai’s wife, and injuring several others. 
At trial in Harbin, the issue was whether Su had intentionally or 
accidentally put the car into forward gear.   After a trial notable for its lack of 
eyewitness testimony, the court ruled the killing an accident and imposed a 
suspended sentence.    
As news of the story spread, the Internet reaction was overwhelming. 
Sina.com, a leading web portal, reported receiving more than 200,000 web 
postings on the case -- even more than the total number of postings regarding the 
SARS crisis earlier in 2003.85  The class difference between owners of the BMW 
                                                 
81 See, e.g., Ouyang Bin [LZ-31], supra note 41 (arguing that the death sentence was reinstated 
due to the combined efforts of internet and print media); Guo Liang [LZ-34], supra note 40. 
82 See, e.g., Shenyang “Heidao Bazhu” Liu Yong Bei Panchu Sixing [Shenyang “Godfather of 
Black Society” Liu Yong Is Sentenced to Death], http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/index.shtml 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2005) [LP-47]; Shenyang Liu Yong An [Shenyang Liu Yong Case], 
http://news.sina.com.cn/z/liuyongsy/1.shtml (lasted visited Mar. 1, 2006) [LZ-LY5].  
83 Shenyang “Godfather of Black Society” Liu Yong Is Sentenced to Death [LP-47], supra note 82. 
84 Xiao Yuhen, Panchu Liu Yong Sixing Ye Shi Yulun Jiandu De Shengli [Sentencing Liu Yong To 
Death Is Also the Victory of Public Opinion Supervision], XINLANG [SINA], Dec. 22, 2003, 
http://tech.sina.com.cn/me/2003-12-22/1447271669.shtml [L Z-LY4]. 
85 “Baoma” Zhuangren An Wangshang Dianji Lü Weiju Di Yi, Chaoguo Feidian [The Case of 
“BMW” Hitting People Gets the Most Internet Reading, Exceeding SARS], XINHUA WANG 
[XINHUA WEB],  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-01/08/content_1266893.htm [LZ-BMW5].  Sina first 
reported on the case on December 31, 2003; ten days later it reported 220,000 online comments. 
Guo Liang [LZ-34], supra note 40; see also 
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and the onion-cart drove public outrage, as did the questionable nature of the trial. 
Many speculated that political connections of Su, the wife of a prominent 
businessman in Harbin, influenced the outcome.  
In January 2004 authorities announced that the case would be reexamined. 
But the authorities at the same time banned further reporting on the case and 
ordered websites to terminate and remove discussions of the case.  There seemed 
to be a clear effort to establish that internet rage would not overturn the verdict. 
Three months later, official media announced that an investigation lead by 
the Heilongjiang Province Communist Party’s Political-Legal Committee had 
determined that the case had been correctly decided.   Although official 
statements declared that the court’s decision in the BMW case had been upheld, 
observers reported that in fact a number of persons involved in the case were 
sanctioned internally.86  The sanctions were never announced publicly.87  The 
message can be read several ways.  One possibility was that authorities did want 
to protect Su, the driver of the BMW.  But the clear message was that 
malfeasance will be handled internally, and that internet anger can not always be 
allowed to dictate Party or court decisions. 
A similar story came in 2005, when web sites carried extensive discussion 
of the case of Wang Binyu.88  Wang, a migrant worker, was sentenced to death for 
murdering four people, including his construction site foreman and three family 
members.  Wang’s case became famous nationwide following reports in the 
Beijing News.89  He was a symbol of the hardship and exploitation faced by 
China’s millions of migrant workers.  Wang killed his boss after he repeatedly 
failed to pay him.   Said Wang,  “I want to die.  When I am dead, nobody can 
exploit me anymore.  Right?”90 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11@011747.html [LZ-BMW4] (describing the 
on-line discussion forums of the case as “a miracle”).  
86 Interview 2005-45. 
87 The driver in the case, Su Xiuwen, was subject to punishment but was not jailed.  But the 
investigation into the case apparently led to other misdeeds being uncovered.  Thus press reports 
stated that as a result of the investigation into the BMW case, another woman, Han Guizhi, was 
removed from office and tried for corruption. Yuan Heilongjiang Zhengxie Zhuyi Han Guizhi Bei 
Mianzhi Qianhou [The Former Heilongjiang President of the Heilongjiang Political Consultative 
Conference Han Guizhi is Removed from Office], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], June 24, 
2004, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-06-24/03373503585.shtml [LZ-BMW1]; Han Guizhi Jiang 
Zai Beijing Di Yi Zhongyuan Shoushen Jiazhong Shu Ren Bei Shuanggui [Han Guizhi Will be 
Tried in Beijing First Intermediate Court, Several Family Members Have Been “Double 
Specified”], FAZHI WANBAO [LEGAL EVENING NEWS], Mar. 24, 2005, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-03-24/14156183789.shtml [LZ-BMW 3].   
88 For examples, see Siqiu Zuihou Yuanwang: Guanzhu Nongmin Gong [Last Wish of a Criminal 
Waiting for Execution: Paying Attention to Migrant Workers], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS], 
Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.thebeijingnews.com/news/2005/0905/11@011747.html [LZ-W1]; Yuan 
Xiaobing, Shendu; Mingong Wang Binyu De Nu Yu Bei [In Depth: Peasant Worker Wang Binyu’s 
Anger and Sorrow], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Sept. 11, 2005, 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/tszk/nfdsb/sd/200509110183.asp [LZ-W2]. 
89 Last Wish of a Criminal Waiting for Execution [LZ-W1], supra note 88. 
90 Yuan Xiaobing [LZ-W2].  
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Many online postings and articles took Wang’s side, and argued that he 
should be spared.91  As with the BMW case, however, online discussion largely 
stopped following a Central Propaganda Department instruction.92  Wang was 
then quietly executed.  Although news of his execution was posted to the official 
China Court News website the day after his execution,93 domestic media did not 
report on it.  Only after the case received attention in the New York Times did the 
domestic media report on Wang’s death.94   
 
* * * 
 
From these leading cases, and from interviews with journalists, judges, 
and academics, we can describe a general pattern.   First, the growth of the 
internet has made it more difficult for courts to conceal information about cases, 
and more likely that misdeeds will be noticed and reported.  Judges state that 
courts find it hard to conceal information about cases, which increases pressure on 
courts to handle cases according to law.  Courts and Party-state officials that 
oversee the courts cannot be assured of their ability to silence discussion of cases 
simply by issuing an instruction banning further reporting.  As we’ve seen, the 
three most famous cases of internet influence -- the Sun Zhigang, Liu Yong, and 
BMW cases -- all demonstrate how online coverage or discussion can encourage 
Party officials to intervene.  In all of the cases, reports in the print media, reposted 
to major internet portals, were enough to set off a chain-reaction 
This, in turn, has led to a new type of Party-state intervention into the 
operations of the legal system.  The interventions come in response to internet 
outrage, and are marked by a determination to resolve the matter quickly: in the 
Sun case, with the rapid arrest and trial of suspects and then a choreographed 
closed trial; in the Liu Yong case with the Supreme People's Court apparently 
being ordered to rehear the case; and in the BMW case with the investigation of 
the case by Party authorities.95  At the same time, Party propaganda authorities 
curtail any further discussion of the cases other than by officially-approved 
sources -- generally by requiring that the media only use dispatches from the 
Xinhua News Agency.96  Propaganda authorities also order web portals to remove 
or ban discussion of the cases:  one list of terms automatically filtered by one 
                                                 
91 Fu Yingji [LZ-59], supra note 55. 
92 Id. [LZ-59]. 
93 Yang Chao, Wang Binyu Guyi Sharen An Er Shen Xuanpan [The Appeal in Wang Binyu’s 
Intentional Homicide Case is Decided], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Oct. 20, 
2005,  http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=181959 [LZ-W3]. 
94  Yuan Xiaobing, Wang Binyu Sha Ren [Wang Binyu Killed People], NANFANG DUSHI BAO 
[SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], Dec. 31, 2005, 
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/zt/rdzt/zgxwcd/200512310024.asp (reporting on 
Wang’s execution) [LZ-W4]. 
95 “The Case of Nie Shubin Being Killed Wrongfully” is Pending, [LZ-57], supra note 51. 
96 Cf. Fu Yingji, [LZ-59], supra note 55, (discussing restrictions on reporting in the Nie Shubin 
and Wang Binyu cases).  
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Chinese blog service included both “Nie Shubin” and “Wang Binyu.”97  In the 
final step, official media declare the interventions and resulting decisions to be 
successful examples of authorities responding to public opinion.    
Given the possibility of public scrutiny leading to unstoppable pressure, 
political intervention, and even possible punishment for judges, courts are taking 
some preemptive action to better control information.  In recent years courts have 
taken steps to restrict media coverage of cases, requiring reporters to obtain court 
approval prior to attending trials.  Courts frequently either draft articles about 
cases in their court for the local media, or require that all such articles are 
screened by court officials prior to publication.  Courts have also retaliated 
against negative coverage, with both courts and individual judges filing 
defamation lawsuits in response to critical media coverage.  In addition, court 
propaganda or research departments monitor online discussions of cases involving 
individual courts,98 sometimes via daily searches to locate discussions of the cases 
in the media or in discussion forums.99  Finally, while it is hard to say for sure, 
courts may be more inclined to decide cases in ways that are less likely to inflame 
the public, which in the criminal context often means applying harsh sanctions. 
The result is a strange, tense, and slightly rivalrous relationship among the 
courts and the media, major internet providers, and the Party-State.  As we’ve 
seen, the courts fear media reports that might result in popular outrage and 
political intervention.  The media, meanwhile, must balance the risk of 
punishment if they go too far in reporting on sensitive cases with their desire to 
maximize profit through aggressive or sensational reporting.  Party-state officials 
are concerned with maintaining stability -- even at the cost of undermining their 
claims to be emphasizing rule of law.  Unfortunately, this complex web of 
relationships cannot help but sometimes distract from resolving disputes fairly.  
The fears of media attention, public reaction, and Party-state intervention do make 
the legal system more accountable, just not necessarily to the parties before the 
court. 
 
* * * 
 
 Until this point, the paper has focused on communications practices 
between the courts and other actors, including the media, public, and Party-state 
officials.   We now turn to the results of interviews with Chinese judges, to see 
how their communications practices have been affected by the internet revolution. 
 
                                                 
97  Keywords Used to Filter Web Content, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2006, available at 
https://w8.bwanana.com/dmirror/http/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/02/18/AR2006021800554.html. 
98 Interview 2005-10. 
99 In other areas, however, judges say that they are not concerned about internet discussion of 
pending cases, Interview 2005-10  -- perhaps because there is little such discussion in the less 
developed areas of China’s interior.  See, e.g., Interview 2005-12 (stating that there is little online 
discussion of cases in Xi’an). 
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B.  Communications Practices within the Chinese Judiciary 
 
 1.  Traditional Communications Practices. -- To understand how matters 
are changing, we must first describe the traditional communication practices 
within the Chinese judiciary.  To generalize, Chinese judges have operated in a 
context in which they had limited access to horizontal information -- information 
about how other similarly-situated courts were doing their jobs.  Instead their 
primary source of guidance for handling novel or difficult cases has been vertical 
-- consultation with superiors, either within the court hierarchy or in other Party-
state institutions.   Chinese judges have also operated in an environment in which 
their access to information is restricted in some respects and uninhibited in others.  
On the one hand, courts have often had limited access to legal materials and the 
decisions of other judges.  Chinese judges not only knew very little about how 
judges elsewhere were handling cases; in impoverished rural areas they may also 
have lacked easy access to laws, regulations, SPC interpretations and other 
normative documents.  On the other hand, judges have been relatively uninhibited 
in seeking advice on how to handle cases from colleagues, superiors, Party-state 
officials, or academics and experts outside the courts. 
 Since the start of the reform era in 1978, China’s judges have worked in a 
historically unusual legal environment.   During the Mao era, and particularly 
during the Cultural Revolution, many legal institutions were neglected, left to 
play minor roles or used primarily as political tools of the state.  During the 
Cultural Revolution, the legal system ceased to function in any recognizable form.  
Since 1978, great efforts have been made to improve and reform the Chinese legal 
system.  Much of the statutory law was either rewritten or drafted anew.  Judges, 
consequently, have been called on to apply a huge number of new laws, which 
have often been vague or unclear.   Yet despite reform, in many regions judges 
have continued to lack even the basic legal materials required to resolve cases.   
What might strike a foreign observer as the most important sources of guidance -- 
legal education, the laws themselves, and decisions of other courts -- have often 
been unavailable or at the least lacking in detail. 
Limited access to information has not meant that judges confronting hard 
cases have had no other sources for guidance.  First, within individual courts, 
adjudication committees provide guidance (or decide outright) difficult or 
sensitive cases.100  These adjudication committees, which include high ranking 
judges from the court, and sometimes procurators (who participate in discussions 
in some criminal cases, but apparently do not have voting power on the 
committee),101 serve as a venue for discussing challenging or sensitive cases.    
                                                 
100 The range of cases considered by adjudication committees varies substantially.  In most courts 
adjudication committees consider any cases in which the three-judge panel responsible for the case 
can not agree on an outcome.  In some courts adjudication committees consider all cases where a 
defendant has been sentenced to life in prison or death, as well as all cases in which the panel 
decided not to impose a prison sentence on a defendant. 
101 In China, procurators serve both as the prosecution and as supervisors over the legal system.  
Technically the procuracy is a judicial branch of equal rank to the courts.  They are not only the 
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This practice (which has both critics and supporters in China) results in cases that 
are decided in the first instance by judges who have played no role in hearing the 
case.   It can be said to reflect the fact that the concept of judicial independence in 
China refers to courts, not individual judges.  In any case, in addition to the 
formal adjudication committee, judges frequently consult informally with their 
peers and superiors within courts.  Court presidents, who are the most powerful 
figures within individual courts (and who often lack formal legal training), play a 
particularly important role in guiding decisions in cases that are perceived to be 
sensitive or difficult. 
Second, lower court judges have also traditionally sought guidance on 
difficult cases by seeking advice of the superior court through the process known 
as qingshi, or “requesting instruction.”  Judges encountering a difficult or novel 
question can contact the higher-level court -- often by telephone or in person -- to 
discuss how the case should be handled in the court of first instance.  The qingshi 
practice, which bears some resemblance to an informal interlocutory appeal, has 
been criticized for eliminating the point of an appeals process.102  However, it 
continues to be an important mechanism for judges seeking guidance in difficult 
or potentially sensitive cases.103 Chinese judges are evaluated based in part on 
whether their decisions are affirmed or reversed on appeal; a judge who gets a 
decision “wrong” can be fined or, in serious cases, removed from office.  It is thus 
easy to understand why judges might seek guidance from a higher-level court 
prior to issuing a decision.  
Third, China is officially a civil law system, and has no binding system of 
precedent as such.  However, official advice as to how cases should be handled is 
disseminated through public normative documents issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court -- ranging from official interpretations of laws to replies to 
questions or explanations concerning decisions in specific cases -- or by non-
public instructions issued by the SPC or by provincial high courts.   Judges also 
learn of new legal information and of representative cases through official 
publications.  These include the People’s Court News, the official newspaper of 
the court system, which frequently highlights interesting or noteworthy cases 
handled by lower courts, and the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, which 
publishes official decisions and cases from the SPC.  Numerous collections of 
cases have also been published, some under the guidance of the SPC that are 
designed to highlight “representative cases” that courts should follow, and others 
by academics or individual courts.  A few for-profit websites now also provide 
                                                                                                                                     
prosecution, but also have the power to force courts to retry cases where the procuracy thinks the 
courts got it wrong.  Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa [Organization Law of the People’s Courts] arts. 12, 
14, 15 (effective Jan. 1, 1980, as amended Sept. 2, 1983，and October 31, 2006).  
102 See, e.g., “Faguan Chule Falü Jiu Meiyou Bie De Shangsi” [“The Judges Have No Boss Other 
Than Law”], XIN JING BAO [THE BEIJING NEWS] (Dec. 3, 2003), available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2003-12/03/content_1210980.htm [LZ-19].  
103 Some courts in China have taken recent steps to restrict the use of qingshi procedures, requiring 
that all such requests for guidance come in writing, or come from lower court adjudication 
committees (rather than individual judges). 
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collections of cases.104  There is no formal system for publication of cases in 
China, however, or mechanism for searching the cases that are made publicly 
available.  Thus with the exception of information in the People’s Court News 
(which prior to the internet was not searchable), other similar publications, or the 
occasional published collection of cases, judges had little information about how 
to handle cases other than that passed down to them from superior courts. 
Finally, senior judges in courts may also discuss cases with the local Party 
Political-Legal Committee, or with representatives from local people’s congresses 
or government.  This is particularly true in serious criminal cases, in cases that 
have aroused widespread public attention, or in cases that touch on important 
local interests. 
This model, which depends heavily on vertical consultation with superior 
courts or political officials, continues to predominate.  However today the internet 
is changing how many Chinese judges do their job.   In this first section we 
canvass how at least some judges use the internet in deciding cases, including 
some of the uses that may seem unusual from the perspective of practice in other 
nations. 
 2.  New Communications Practices. -- Within China the use of the internet 
by individual judges is beginning to transform communications practices within 
the judiciary, and consequently how law is both used and applied in China.  
Judges who once worked in isolation, without either easy access to national laws 
or information about how similar cases were handled elsewhere, now are able to 
access not only the law on the books, but also how such laws are being applied 
and debated elsewhere.   
 The Chinese judges interviewed for this article overwhelmingly 
commented that they use the internet to conduct research to assist them in 
handling cases -- especially in hard or novel cases.   Perhaps the most interesting 
outcome of such usage is the slow development of what resembles a non-binding 
system of precedent in the Chinese legal system.  Judges state that they are 
developing “unwritten precedent” regarding how to handle cases.105  They note 
that doing so helps to reduce their workload when they encounter new legal 
issues.106   Judges explain that they do not look to other courts’ decisions as 
“precedent,” but rather only for the purposes of reference, or cankao.107   But even 
this non-binding “precedent” may strongly influence decision-making.   
The reported use of informal precedent dovetails with a rise in the interest 
in using precedent in the Chinese legal system.  Since early 2002, the Zhengzhou 
Zhongyuan District Court has experimented with a “precedent decision” system 
whereby the court selects important cases as “models.”108  Similarly, the Supreme 
                                                 
104 Some of these sites claim to have tens of thousands of cases.  In our interviews, however, not a 
single judge mentioned ever having consulted such commercial websites to research cases. 
105 Interview 2005-85. 
106 Interview 2005-12. 
107 Interview 2005-12.  
108  See Constructing a Case-Law System with Chinese Characteristic? A Precedent-Decision 
System Emerges from Zhengzhou, CHINA NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2002, available at 
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People’s Court has within recent years begun referring to its model decisions as 
“legal precedent.”  However, the internet-driven use of informal precedent 
exceeds the scope of these experiments.  
Some of the greatest consequences of these developments may be for the 
more remote parts of China.   For example, judges from places like Qinghai 
Province, in western China, explained that they frequently consult court web sites 
in more developed areas of China to see how they have handled particular legal 
issues.109 
This is a break from traditional practice.  Judges encountering new legal 
questions have traditionally sought assistance from their superiors, either in their 
own court, or in higher-ranking courts.  The growth of the internet suggests that 
courts may increasingly be able to look horizontally, to courts elsewhere in China, 
whereas in the past they would have sought assistance from those above them.  
Over the long-term, the development of an informal system of precedent 
may significantly change the Chinese legal system.  It may lead to a greater 
confidence born of national consistency, and the authority of acting in concert.   
That may in turn lead to greater institutional security and autonomy, as judges 
rely on the strength of the judgment of others, as opposed to mere personal 
judgment. 
Yet the internet is not only permitting the development of horizontal 
interactions among judges.  The internet is also a mechanism for strengthening 
existing vertical relationships in the courts, and perhaps even control over 
individual judges by superiors within the courts.   Numerous courts in China have 
established internal court networks, designed to facilitate court work, improve 
efficiency, and also strengthen oversight over individual judges.   In sum, internal 
networks show how the internet may also serve the Party-state’s interests in 
control.   
 We first explore ways in which judges are using the external web, and 
then turn to the impact of internal court networks. 
i.  Finding Cases. -- The best place for Chinese judges to find useful cases 
is, ironically, sometimes outside of the courthouse.  Few judges in China have 
access to the external internet (the internet as it exists in China) from work, as 
many courts do not permit judges other than those in court propaganda 
departments to access the external web from work.110  In other courts only the 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.chinanewsweek.com.cn/2002-09-06/1/357.html (Center for Chinese Legal Studies 
translation). 
109 See, e.g., Interview 2005-9. 
110 Interview 2005-10, Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18; see also Interview 2005-51 (stating 
that at a district court in Beijing judges are not allowed to go online from their offices, but that 
there is a computer at the court that judges can use to go online if they need to do so); Interview 
2005-58 (stating that judges at the Beijing High People’s Court do not have access to the external 
web from their offices, but that they can go to the court library if they want to go online).  In 
economically well-off areas of Jiangsu Province, some offices have two computers -- one for the 
internal network and one for the external network.  Interview 2005-63. 
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court president has access to the external web.111  Such restrictions may derive 
both from concerns that judges will waste time online, and from concerns that 
judges will use the internet to reveal confidential or secret information.112  But in 
some courts access to the internet also appears to be a sign of status -- akin to 
having a car and driver -- with only the highest ranking judges being permitted to 
go online from work. 
 Despite these restrictions, a great many judges say that they use the 
external network to aid their decision–making, particularly to research legal 
questions and to see how other courts have handled cases similar to those before 
them.113  In the central Chinese city of Xi’an, judges use the internet to consult 
cases decided by the Supreme People’s Court, and by the Shaanxi Provincial High 
People’s Court, as well as decisions from other courts.114  In Shenyang, judges 
note that they consult both the web sites of other courts and media reports for 
information on cases.115  Even in areas in which courts lack computers judges 
state that they frequently conduct online research when they encounter difficult 
cases.116  Some judges have access to the internet at home; others go to web 
cafes.117   
As one judge put it, “the effect is huge.”118  A judge working in a rural 
county court in central China (which lacks both an internal network and access to 
the external web) gave the example of determining how to apportion blame in 
traffic accidents when both sides share liability.  Going online, judges “found that 
in Guangdong there is a standard for the whole province for this.”119  Although 
not in Guangdong and thus not obligated to use the standard, the court decided to 
use the Guangdong rule.  “In the past we only looked at cases in our court” for 
guidance, commented the judge.  Now the court looks elsewhere.120 
On the external internet, judges rely on the same tools that other 
participants in the legal system use to build legal arguments.  Summaries of cases 
on China Court Web and the websites of individual courts, media reports, and 
other sources give judges an idea as to how cases have been decided.   Judges also 
frequent prominent academic web sites, including the Civil and Commercial Law 
Website of Renmin University.121  Judges say that it is often easier to locate legal 
                                                 
111 Interview 2005-64.  In other locales vice presidents also have access. 
112 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-77. 
113 Interview 2005-9; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-85; Interview 2006-36; Interview 2006-
76; see also Interview 2005-12 (stating that when judges encounter new types of cases they will 
sometimes go online at home to see how other courts have handled the issue); Interview 2005-51 
(judge stating that he will sometimes search online for information regarding how other courts 
have handled similar cases). 
114 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12. 
115 Interview 2005-64; Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-85. 
116 Interview 2005-95; Interview 2005-96. 
117 Interview 2005-95; Interview 2006-49. 
118 Interview 2006-34. 
119 Interview 2006-35. 
120 Id. 
121 Interview 2005-65; Interview 2005-70. 
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materials on the web that on internal court networks, which they say are often 
incomplete or are infrequently updated.122   Simply making it easier for judges to 
locate binding law is an important development:  in the past, judges often had no 
easy way to locate relevant laws and other materials.  As one judge explained, 
courts often have one book for hundreds of people, making it difficult for 
individual judges to actually locate materials.123 
The most significant examples of internet research are in cases where the 
law is uncertain, or in which judges face difficult legal questions.124    Judges state 
they routinely search web sites of other courts for examples of cases similar to 
those before them.125  For example, a judge specializing in intellectual property 
cases in Beijing stated that judges hearing such cases will often look online to see 
how similar cases have been handled elsewhere, including overseas.126    
Judges are not the only ones using the internet in this way.  Lawyers also 
say they use the internet to conduct research, and that they often will provide 
judges with printouts of materials they locate online, including information about 
similar cases elsewhere. 127  One lawyer recounted how, in a case in which his 
client had been sentenced to death in the first instance, he located a newspaper 
report regarding a case from the same city in which a defendant in a similar case 
had been sentenced to fifteen years in prison, not death.  The appellate court then 
reduced the sentence.128  Public interest lawyers say that they have used web sites 
to link plaintiffs and lawyers who are bringing similar cases nationwide. 129  
Lawyers say that law firm websites can also be useful for gathering information 
about prior cases -- and that they sometimes will print out materials from such 
sites to provide to judges.130  Likewise procurators say that they frequently use the 
internet to conduct research where the law is unclear, in particular in determining 
the appropriate crime with which to charge a defendant.   
Some courts appear to be particularly important sources of precedent.  
Thus, for example, intellectual property divisions at the intermediate courts in 
Beijing, or in Beijing’s Haidian District (home to many technology companies), 
are seen as being influential.131  Likewise, judges in the interior say that they often 
                                                 
122 Interview 2005-55. 
123 Interview 2005-54. 
124 Interview 2005-65 (stating that judges in Liaoning routinely look online when confronted with 
new cases); Interview 2005-78 (stating that judges frequently use the internet when they encounter 
issues that existing law do not clearly govern); Interview 2005-84 (same); Interview 2005-82 
(stating that judges will look online for cases, news reports, and academic articles when they 
encounter new legal issues). 
125 Interview 2005-17. 
126 Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-104;  see also Interview 2005-58 (stating that Beijing High 
People’s Court judges frequently use the internet to look for cases from overseas); Interview 2005-
70 (stating that judges in Changchun will use the internet to research developments overseas) 
127 Interview 2006-31; Interview 2006-45. 
128 Interview 2006-17. 
129 Interview 2006-25. 
130 Interview 2006-37. 
131 Interview 2006-4. 
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look for guidance to courts in Beijing and Shanghai -- where judges are widely 
regarded as being better qualified than in many other areas of China.132   
The practice of using the internet to look for useful precedent or other 
guidance is among the most potentially significant developments in judicial 
communications.  However, for the most part, what it does is mimic what we see 
in other legal systems, both civil and common law.  In the next section we discuss 
more novel ways in which Chinese courts are using the internet. 
ii.  Innovations.  -- Some of the ways courts use the internet in China may 
strike a Western observer as surprising or unusual.  Here we discuss several 
examples where judges have used the network in ways that appear distinct from 
the rest of the world.   The first examples involve using court web sites for public 
relations purposes. 
In 2004, the Shiquan County Court in Shaanxi Province came under fire 
from local media when it dismissed the case of migrant worker Xu Dengkai for 
being eight minutes late for a hearing.  Xu contracted silicosis from work at a 
local factory and sued to challenge a labor arbitration award.  The labor 
arbitration committee had ordered that the defendant factory pay him 6,200 yuan 
(about $775), while Xu argued that he was entitled to 217,206 yuan (about 
$27,000).133  On the date of the hearing, however, Xu arrived slightly late.134  By 
the time he arrived, the court had already dismissed his case for failure to appear, 
forcing Xu to forfeit 14,000 yuan ($1750) in court filing fees that he had already 
paid.135 
The Huashang News, a leading commercial newspaper in the provincial 
capital, Xi’an, wrote an editorial entitled “The Legal System Should Not Be 
Frozen.”  The newspaper argued that dropping the case was an unduly harsh 
punishment for a litigant who was five minutes late.136  It pointed out that the 
plaintiff had to travel by train from outside the mountainous county to arrive at 
                                                 
132 Interview 2006-67. 
133 Da Yao Anjian Tongbao 2005 (Di Yi Qi) [Notice of Big and Important Cases 2005 (no. 1)], Feb. 
24, 2005, http://www.aaawww.net/select/selectl.php3?id=372207&userid=24245 [LP-32]. 
134 Mingong Dagong Huan Xifei Suopei Chesu, Zhengfu Guanyuan Shexian Cangu? [Peasant 
Worker who Got Silicosis Through Working Withdraws Suit for Compensation, are Government 
Officials Suspected of Owning Stocks?], HUASHANG BAO [HUASHANG NEWS], Sept. 18, 2005, 
available at http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-09/18/content_2222951.htm [LP-34]; “Fazhi” 
Buying Leng Bing Bing [“The Legal System” Should Not be Frozen], HUASHANG BAO 
[HUASHANG NEWS], Jan. 12, 2005, available at http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-
01/12/content_1564512.htm [LP-43]. 
135 Zhi Yin Kaiting 5 Fenzhong Nei Wei Dao, Hanyin Mingong Suopei Zao Chesu [Because of Five 
Minutes Late for Court, Hanyin Peasant Worker is Ruled to Have Withdrawn His Claim for 
Compensation], HUASHANG WANG [HUASHANG WEB], available at 
http://news.huash.com/gb/news/2005-01/12/content_1564511.htm[LP-44]; Notice of 
Big and Important Cases in 2005 [LP-32], supra note 133.  In most civil cases in China plaintiffs 
are required to pay a filing fee that is a specified percentage of the amount in controversy. 
136 Legal System” Should Not be Frozen [LP-43], supra note 134; Peasant Worker Withdraws Suit 
[LP-34], supra note 134. 
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the court by 8:30 a.m.  It also wrote that the worker was in poor health as a result 
of the injuries he had suffered at work.137   
The court, slighted, turned to the internet to defend itself online.  Its first 
act was to release a report that argued that it had handled the case fully in 
compliance with the law.138  Next, court judges responded to and debated with 
critics on the court’s public internet message board.139  One comment posted to 
the court’s electronic bulletin board urged the court to admit that its handling of 
the case had been incorrect.  In response, a court official wrote that because the 
case was still on appeal it could not be said to have been incorrectly decided.  In 
another exchange, a posting complained that the case was “not readable.”  The 
court thanked the poster of the message for the criticism, and stated that the court 
needed to continue to strengthen its ability “to serve social stability and 
development.”140  Some of the court’s postings were identified as coming from 
the court president, while others appeared to come from other court officials. 
Later on, the court backed down, and permitted the plaintiff to refile the 
case without having to pay the court fees a second time.  Without mentioning the 
controversy or criticism, the court posted a report on the case on its website as an 
example of how the court was working to further the “advanced education” policy 
of the Communist Party.  The court posted a picture of Xu to the court’s 
homepage, with a caption stating, “Our Court Carries out Judicial Assistance in 
the Case of  Xu Dengkui.”141  The court noted that it had taken account of the 
plaintiff’s status as a worker from outside the county, and had therefore decided to 
waive the court fee and schedule an afternoon hearing so that Xu would be able to 
attend.  The report also stated that the court had been praised by the parties to the 
case and the media.142 
The Xu case is just one example of how courts use their websites for 
public relations purposes.  Hundreds of Chinese courts -- ranging from the 
Supreme People’s Court to rural county courts -- have created public websites.143  
                                                 
137 Notice of Big and Important Cases in 2005 [LP-32], supra note 133; “Legal System” Should 
Not be Frozen [LP-43], supra note 134. 
138  Kan Ankang Shiquan Fayuan Zenyang Lueduo Nongmingong [See How Ankang Shiquan 
County Court Plunders Peasant Worker], 
http://bbs.sxtvs.com/printpage.asp?BoardID=34&ID=48266 (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) [LP-45] 
(bbs chatroom).  The court argued that the plaintiff had failed to provide an excuse for being late, 
and thus the court’s action was justified under China’s Civil Procedure Law.  Id. 
139  Interview 2005-16; Shanxi Shiquan County Court Message Board, 
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c= [LZ-18].  
140 See id. 
141 http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4.  
142 Shiquan Xian Renmin Fayuan Zai Baochi Gongchan Dangyuan Xianjin Xing Jiaoyu [Shiquan 
County People’s Court Maintains the Advanced Teaching of the Communist Party], 
http://www.aaawww.net/select/select1.php3?id=378962&userid=24245 (last visited Oct. 13, 2005) 
[LP-31]. 
143 As of August 2006, the official China Court Web site included links to 110 other court websites 
in 22 provinces.  Fayuan Zaixian [Courts Online], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT 
WEB], http://www.chinacourt.org/fyzx/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2006) [LZ-4].  The list, however, is 
not comprehensive.  Zhongguo Fayuan Wang Jianjie Ji Jianwang Xuzhi [Brief Introduction of 
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Court public websites frequently include information such as an overview of court 
work and personnel, news from the court, and discussion forums.144  Although 
urban courts were first to establish web sites, even courts in some rural areas have 
sites that provide information about the court, judges, and cases.145  
Court websites focus on providing information about the court, largely to 
educate the public about such work, and to achieve other propaganda goals.  The 
Supreme People’s Court’s web site, for example, includes news on the court, 
primarily focused on the activities of court leaders; an introduction to each branch 
of the court and to each judge on the court; explanations, interpretations, replies 
and other normative documents issued by the court; selected decisions of the court 
(but none from the past two years); model decisions from lower courts; and the 
court’s annual work reports to the National People’s Congress.146   The website 
makes it easier to access the  same type of information that the court already 
makes publicly available through the People’s Court News, the Court’s Gazette, 
and regularly published books of selected decisions from lower courts.   
Another important and widely read site is the China Court Web, which we 
discussed above.147  The China Court Web carries news articles regarding the 
courts, laws and regulations, academic legal materials, and online discussion 
forums and chatrooms regarding legal matters.  The China Court Web is a 
particularly important place for judges to read about what other courts are doing -- 
and to help find the informal precedent discussed above.  The site is run by the 
People’s Court News, the official newspaper of the Supreme People’s Court, and 
thus is directly under the supervision of the Supreme People’s Court.148  The site 
includes both content in the paper, and also a wide range of material that does not 
make it into the print version.     
Lower court web sites are similar.   They focus on highlighting court work 
and educating the public about such work, either through selected opinions from 
cases or summaries of cases, and articles written by judges.149 Cases included on 
                                                                                                                                     
China Court Web and Notice of Web Construction], Zhongguo Fayuan Wang [China Court Web], 
http://www.chinacourt.org/other/detail.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) [LZ-5].  For example, 
although an internet search found that five courts in Shanghai had public web sites, only one was 
listed on the SPC website.    
144  See, e.g., Ankang Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Ankang Intermediate Court], 
http://www.akfy.org.cn (web site of Ankang Municipal Intermediate Court) [LP-30]. 
145 Shaanxi Sheng Shiquan Xian Renmin Fayuan [Shaanxi Province Shiquan County People’s 
Court], http://www.sqfy.com/index.php3?file=4.php [LP-33]; Interview 2005-14; see also 
Xingguo Xian Renmin Fayuan [Xingguo County People’s Court], http://xgxfy.chinacourt.org/ 
(Jiangxi Province Xingguo County Court); Hebei Sheng Gu’an Xian Renmin Fayuan [Hebei 
Province Gu’an County People’s Court], http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/; Shangdong Sheng Kenli 
Xian Renmin Fayuan [Shangdong Province Kenli County People’s Court] 
http://klfy.chinacourt.org/. 
146 The website also includes links to pages covering court history and an online video, but both 
links are empty.  The site appears to be under construction, which may also explain the small 
number of cases included on the site.  
147 http://www.chinacourt.org/. 
148 See Guanyu Women [About Us], at http://www.chinacourt.org/other/aboutus.php. 
149 See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/aljx/index.asp. 
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web sites are generally selected by court propaganda officials with a view to 
highlighting noteworthy or new cases.150  
Few courts post all or even many of their decisions online.   Indeed, only 
one court is known to have done so: in 2000, the Guangzhou Maritime Court 
announced that all of its decisions would be made available online.151  The court 
website now includes 777 cases decided between 2001 and 2005.152   Other courts 
have similarly pledged to make all cases available online, or all intellectual 
property cases,153 but such promises appear to have gone unfulfilled.154   Most 
courts continue to post only a small number of selected decisions or case 
descriptions.  
                                                 
150 Interview 2005-63. 
151  Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan Panjueshu Shangwang [Guangzhou Maritime Court Posts 
Decisions Online], ZHONGXINSHE WANGZHAN [CHINA NEWS AGENCY WEBSITE], Oct. 12, 2000, 
available at http://dailynews.sina.com.cn/society/2000-10-12/134098.html [LZ-7]. 
152  Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan Caipan Wenshu [Guangzhou Maritime Court Judgment 
Documents], http://www.gzhsfy.net/writ/index.php (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) [LZ-8].  In a 2005 
article the court stated that it posts  “announcements of cases, decisions and introductions to 
judges” online. Guangzhou Haishi Fayuan [Guangzhou Maritime Court], Yunyong Xiandai Xinxi 
Jishu, Jiaqiang Haishi Sifa Nengli Jianshe [Using Modern Information Technology, Enhancing 
the Construction of Maritime Judicial Ability], ZHONGGUO SHEWAI SHANGSHI SHENPAN WANG 
[CHINA FOREIGN-RELATED COMMERCIAL TRIAL WEB], Nov. 23, 2005, 
http://www.ccmt.org.cn/ss/news/show.php?cId=6356 [LZ-9].  
153 For example, the Beijing High People’s Court reported in 2003 that all intellectual property 
cases from all courts in Beijing would be published online.  Beijing Gaoji Renmin Fayuan 
[Beijing People’s High Court], Nüli Jiang Beijing Fayuan Wang Bancheng Tese Jingpin 
Wangzhan [Endeavoring to Make the Beijing Court Net A Unique and Excellent Website], 
ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], Nov 28, 2003, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=92553 [LZ-12].  As of February 2006, the web 
site included 863 decisions -- although it is not clear whether that number reflects all intellectual 
property cases in the municipality.  Zhishi Chanquan Anjian [Intellectual Property Cases], 
BEIJING FAYUAN WANG [BEIJING COURT WEB] (last visited Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/cpws/?sub=2 [LZ-13].   
154 A 2003 report stated that Beijing courts would begin publishing all decisions from all three 
levels of Beijing courts online, and would thus become the “first courts in the world” to do so. 11 
Yue Beijing Fayuan Caipanshu Quanbu Shangwang, Cheng Shijie Shang Shouli [All Beijing Court 
Decisions To Be Posted On-line from November, the First In the World to Do So], BEIJING YULE 
XINBAO [BEIJING ENTERTAINMENT NEWS], Nov. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.edisc.com.cn/bike/viewnews.btml?id=16230 [LZ-14].   Yet as of February 2006 the 
court’s web site listed only fifteen cases other than intellectual property cases.  Qita Anjian [Other 
Cases], Beijing Fayuan Wang [Beijing Court Web] (last visited Feb. 22, 2006), 
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/cpws/?sub=8 [LZ-15]; see also Guangdong Foshan Fayuan Panjueshu 
Shangwang [Guangdong Foshan Court Putting Decisions Online], NANFANG DUSHI BAO 
[SOUTHERN METROPOLITAN DAILY], July 1, 2003, available at http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/c/2003-
07-01/1059204196.shtml (statement by Guangdong Foshan Intermediate court stating the types of 
cases that will and will not be posted online) [LZ-16].  In an online essay, Peking University 
professor He Weifang commented that he had found no court in China that made all decisions 
available without modification online.  See He Weifang, Panjueshu Shangwang Nan Zai He Chu? 
[What’s the Difficulty of Putting Decisions On-line?], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL DAILY], Dec. 15, 2005, 
available at http://law-thinker.com/show.asp?id=3025. 
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Finally, as is common in the West, court sites also provide information to 
potential litigants -- ranging from court rules and regulations, to explanations of 
litigation procedures, to instructions on how to file cases and the risks and costs 
involved in bringing lawsuits.155  Other courts include hearing times,156 selected 
laws and regulations,157 instructions regarding the formulation of legal documents 
and examples of such documents,158 and court legal notices.159  The Shenzhen 
Intermediate Court includes a link to live broadcasts of selected court hearings, 
although the system does not yet appear to be functional.160  Some court websites 
also provide online mechanisms for citizens to file complaints about the court161 -- 
although judges say few such complaints are filed.162   
 The growth of court websites reflects greater emphasis on public relations 
and media management by China’s courts.163  Courts have increasingly found 
themselves coming under criticism, in particular from China’s newly 
commercialized media.  Courts are also coming into conflict with other Party-
state institutions, including People’s Congresses, Procuratorates, and 
administrative actors.  Web sites provide a mechanism for improving the 
reputations and images of courts, and perhaps thus for raising courts’ status in 
their interactions with other official actors.  Both the courts generally and 
individual judges -- and in particular court presidents -- have an interest in raising 
their profiles with higher-ranking leaders and with the public.  The development 
of public websites also reflects rhetorical commitment by the courts to the 
importance of boosting transparency as a means for raising popular confidence in 
the legal system, and to boosting legal knowledge among ordinary people so as to 
make the courts more accessible.  Internet sites, and in particular court news sites 
such as the official China Court Web, do make an enormous amount of 
information available, both to other judges and to the public.  Yet like the 
embrace of the internet by the Chinese Party-state more generally, the content on 
                                                 
155  Interview 2005-70; See also Beijing Fayuan Wang [Beijing Court Web], 
http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/bjfy/  (introducing the basic functioning of courts in Beijing); 
http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/sscx.htm  (explaining litigation procedures on the Jiangsu Court 
Network).  
156 See, e.g., http://www.shezfy.com/OpenJudge.asp?show=week.  
157 See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/cyfl.htm.  
158 See, e.g., http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/sszn/szgs.htm.  
159 See, e.g., http://www.shezfy.com/BulletDetail.asp?id=586.  
160 Shenzhen Shi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan [Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court], Wang Shang 
Kai Ting [Live Broadcasts of Court Hearings Online], http://www.szcourt.gov.cn/tszj.php. 
161 See, e.g., Hainan Gaoyuan Xieshou Sike Gongzhu Ban’an Xin Pingtai [Hainan High Court 
Constructs New Working Platform Hand in Hand with Cisco], 
http://www.enet.com.cn/article/2004/1015/A20041015352752.shtml, Oct. 15, 2004 (reporting that 
courts in Hainan Province have established an online web page through which citizens may report 
on misconduct by court officials) [LP-6]. 
162 See, e.g., Interview 2005-70 (stating that a court a court in Changchun receives few complaints 
via its web site). 
163 Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue?, supra note 20. 
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courts’ public websites also suggest a greater emphasis on managing information 
than on making such information publicly available.  
iii.  Judges Online.  -- In 2006, in the Shiquan County People’s Court in 
Shaanxi, an anonymous user posted a message advising the court to ignore a case 
brought by an elderly woman against her granddaughter for financial support.   
The message was posted to the court’s bbs chatroom, where court officials and 
sometimes the court president respond to postings from the public (and where the 
same court had previously defended itself in the Xu Denkai case).  The poster 
argued that that the plaintiff’s daughter, an alternative source of support, was alive 
and in another town.164  The poster suggested that the grandmother was treating 
the court president like her grandson -- expecting him to provide assistance 
simply because she was elderly.   
In a posted reply, a court official stated that the court would do their best 
to handle the case (and would not ignore it).  Later, the court president himself 
responded.  He stated that he had resolved the case by contacting the local civil 
affairs bureau, and asked the bureau to provide financial support. The court 
president acknowledged that it was not the court’s role to take such actions, but 
stated that he had done so because the plaintiff was old, and because the plaintiff 
recognized the importance of the courts.165 
As this example shows, Chinese judges sometimes venture onto public 
web sites to handle cases or discuss legal issues with members of the public.166 
Judges even frequent discussions on public chatrooms, such as those on China 
Court Web.167  Most judges state that they will not discuss actual cases before 
them in online forums before such cases are decided.  But there are also examples 
of judges using such discussion boards to help determine how to best decide a 
case.168   In one example, a judge reported how a colleague had used online 
discussions with legal scholars and ordinary people to “obtain consensus” as to 
                                                 
164  Shanxin Shiquan County Court Message Board, 
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4 (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006) [LZ-27]. 
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index.php3?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4; 
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=.  
165  Shanxin Shiquan County Court Message Board, 
http://www.aaawww.net/bbs/index2.php?userid=24245&c=&infotype=&page=4 (last visited Feb. 
27, 2006) [LZ-27]. 
166 See, e.g., Shanghai: Yangpu Fayuan De Juyuwang BBS Tigao Gongzuo Xiaolü [Shanghai: 
Yangpu Court Internal Network Enhances Efficiency], XINWEN CHENBAO [NEWS MORNING], Nov. 
17, 2004, available at http://news.chinabyte.com/396/1876896.shtml (noting online meeting 
between judges and “internet friends”) [LP-20]. 
167 Interview 2005-65.   Judges sometimes self-identify as judges in their postings on bulletin 
boards and in discussion forums.  See, e.g., Yang Fan, Dui Yiqi Zhiwu Qinzhan Zui De Zhiyi 
[Doubts on an Official Embezzlement Criminal Case], FAZHI LUNTAN [CHINA COURT WEB BBS], 
Feb. 8, 2006, http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=139693 [LZ-20]. 
168  See, e.g., Wo Chengban Yijian Xingzheng Anjian [An Administrative Case that I’m 
Adjudicating], FAZHI LUNTAN [CHINA COURT WEB BBS], Feb. 21, 2006, 
http://bbs.chinacourt.org/index.php?showtopic=141739 (discussion by judge of case after decision, 
requesting comments from other participants in a web discussion forum) [LZ-30]. 
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how a case should be handled. 169  He praised the use of online forums for 
facilitating interactions between judges and the masses.  And even judges who are 
cautious about participating in online discussions regarding cases themselves said 
that they nevertheless will sometimes consult such discussions when deciding 
cases.170 
Judges also use email to help decide cases.  Judges in relatively remote 
areas say that they sometimes email leading academics to ask their views of 
particular legal issues.171  This already the practice in major cities like Beijing, 
where judges frequently consult with academics when they encounter new or 
difficult legal issues.  The growth of the internet makes it easier for judges in less 
developed areas to do the same.172  As an extension of the informal precedent 
system we described earlier, judges say that they also sometimes use the internet 
to locate courts that have encountered similar legal issues in the past, and then 
telephone the judges who handled the cases to discuss how they reached their 
decisions.173   
Finally, in recent years, some judges have taken to blogging.  Web sites 
such as the China Court Web include blogging sections, where judges discuss a 
variety of issues, including general views of their work and also sometimes 
particular legal issues.174  Some judges appear to be using blogs to advance their 
own careers -- writing in ways that highlight their own work (and how they 
advance the Party-state’s goals for the legal system).  Many of the blogs appear to 
serve a mixture of education and propaganda goals.  Thus, for example, Judge Wu 
Jinpeng, a judge on the Henan Province High People’s court, used his blog to 
describe the court proceedings in a capital case -- describing how the court held a 
public hearing on appeal, and how such proceedings received praise from all 
parties, including the defendant, who thanked the court for its fair handling of his 
case.175  Another judge, identified as Lan Cai, discussed cases ranging from a 
dispute over an insurance contract, to a claim brought by local residents 
challenging an administrative regulation.176   A judge writing under the name 
Judge Song Zhumei, used a blog to discuss criminal cases, asking, in one case, 
whether particular facts should be treated as an accident or as giving rise to a 
                                                 
169 Interview 2005-82. 
170 Interview 2006-34. 
171 Interview 2005-65. 
172 In Shenyang, the largest city in northeast China, an official document from the intermediate 
court stated that consultations with experts should be done by telephone, letter, fax, email, orally, 
through seminars and lectures, or through other appropriate means.  Shenyang Shi Zhongji Renmin 
Fayuan Zhuanjia Zixuntuan Gongzuo Banfa [Shenyang Municipality Intermediate People’s Court 
Expert Consultation Group Working Methods], Nov. 17, 2004, available at 
http://cdfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=1386 [LZ-26].  The document, however, only 
refers to cases in which an official decision has been taken by the court to request the views of an 
expert; in reality judges in China also consult informally with outside experts. 
173 Interview 2005-49; Interview 2005-51; Interview 2005-77. 
174 See http://blog.chinacourt.org/ (homepage for blogs on the official China Court Web site). 
175 http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?p=34042&author=130. 
176 http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=1494. 
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charge of criminal negligence.177  And a judge writing under the name Jia Mu 
used a blog to discuss a range of civil cases, including a claim of harassment via a 
cell phone message and a medical malpractice case.178   
All of these cases appeared to be examples of already decided cases -- 
judges do not appear to blog about pending cases.  Moreover, none of the judges 
interviewed for this article mentioned blogs as an important source of information 
in deciding cases.  This is not surprising: the use of blogs in China has exploded 
during the period in which we conducted our research.  But it does appear that 
blogs are emerging as another important mechanism through which judges both 
share information about cases before them, and perhaps also interact with the 
public and the legal community regarding interesting or novel cases. 
 In sum, Chinese judges are experimenting with a variety of new ways of 
using the internet to either handle their legal duties or conduct public relations.  
The long-term implications of these activities are not clear.  Nevertheless, China 
may serve as an interesting case study for the rest of the world. 
 
3.  Internal Networks.  -- Use of the external internet and the development 
of court public websites represent just one aspect of how internet technology is 
changing China’s courts.  One reason most judges are not able to go on the 
external internet from work is that many Chinese courts have constructed internal 
court networks (another is that many basic level courts lack computers).   
The developments we describe above regarding how judges use the 
internet have gone largely unnoticed in academic and media writings in China.179  
The Chinese media have, however, covered in detail the development of internal 
court networks -- networks that can be accessed only by court personnel.  These 
networks, known in Chinese as juyu wang, generally link judges within a 
particular court; in some more developed areas they link lower courts with higher 
courts.   In some respects internal networks provide similar types of information 
and opportunities for interaction that are provided on the external internet:  judges 
have easier access to laws and regulations and some selected cases than in the past, 
and in some courts can share their views about cases with other judges in 
chatrooms.  Internal networks, like the external web, make it easier for judges to 
do their jobs. 
Yet the information on such sites is limited to that selected by court 
officials, and thus is often far less comprehensive than what is available on the 
external internet.  Judges using internal networks are limited to seeing those 
materials that their superiors want them to see.  In addition, internal networks are 
also an important mechanism for monitoring work by individual judges.  In this 
                                                 
177 http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=5008. 
178 http://blog.chinacourt.org/wp-profile1.php?cat=3&author=529. 
179 One exception is an interview with us about our research in Procuratorate Daily, one of 
China’s leading legal newspapers.  Liu Hui, Meiguo “Zhongguo Fa Yanjiu” Xuezhe Tan -- Hulian 
Wang Dui Faguan Ji Fazhi De Yingxiang [American “Chinese Legal Research” Scholars Discuss 
-- The Impact of the Internet on Judges and the Rule of Law], JIANCHA RIBAO [PROCURATORATE 
DAILY], July 24, 2006, available at http://www.jcrb.com/n1/jcrb1004/ca530254.htm. 
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respect courts’ use of the internet may be seen as a parable for China’s embrace of 
the internet more generally:  more information is available, and judges are able to 
do their jobs more efficiently (and, one hopes, more fairly), but the internet is also 
serving the state’s interests in imposing oversight and control. 
In a 2002 notice, the SPC instructed all courts in China to set up networks 
or individual computers with software allowing allow judges to search laws and 
other legal materials.180  Courts have gradually complied with the notice.  Reports 
in 2003 and 2004 on the development of the internet in China’s courts stated that 
500-600 of China’s approximately 4,000 courts had established internal 
networks.181  Many more courts appear to have set up internal networks since then, 
or are in the process of doing so. 
Discussions of the role of internal networks focus on their role in making 
courts more efficient.  Thus, for example, reports have noted that developing 
internal networks raises court efficiency by strengthening information 
management and “leadership methods” in the courts.182  Reports have also noted 
the importance of court networks in facilitating supervision of lower courts by 
higher courts.183   
                                                 
180 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa “Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe 
Guanli Guiding” He “Renmin Fayuan Jisuanji Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Guihua” De 
Tongzhi [The Supreme People’s Court Notice on Printing and Circulating the “Regulation on the 
Administration of the Establishment of the People’s Court Computer Information Network 
System” and the “Plan for Establishing the People’s Court Computer Information Network 
System”], Jan. 29, 2002, available at 
http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/LawData/flfg2002/gfsfjs/2003-02/19/1518560846.html [LZ-6] 
(stating that all courts should establish internal court networks in order to improve management of 
cases and case statistics; in theory the networks should connect provincial courts to the SPC).  In 
2002, the SPC instructed all provincial high courts and intermediate courts to establish court 
networks by 2003 and to link such networks to the SPC’s network, and instructed all local courts 
generally to establish court networks by 2005.  Id. [LZ-6] The SPC does not appear to have made 
public more recent data on progress toward meeting such goals. 
181 Renmin Fayuan Xinxi Wangluo Xitong Jianshe Jishu Guifan Tushu Neirong Jianjie [Brief 
Introduction to Technology Criteria for the Establishment of the People’s Court Information 
Network System], available at http://www.law-lib.com/shopping/shopview_p.asp?id=11349 (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2005) [LP-48]; Quanguo Fayuan Xitong Yiji Zhuanwang Shipin Huiyi Xitong De 
Guihua Yu Jianshe [Plan and Construction of the National Courts’ First Level Special Network 
Video Conference System], ZHONGGUO DUOMEITI SHIXUN [CHINA MULTIMEDIA VIDEO 
COMMUNICATIONS], March 5, 2004, http://www.cmvc.com.cn/list.asp?id=338 [LP-50].   
182  Brief Introduction to the Technical Criteria for the Establishment of the People’s Court 
Information Network System [LP-48], supra note 181; Plan and Construction of the National 
Courts’ First Level Special Network Video Conference System [LP-50], supra note 181; see also 
Hanbin Fayuan Jiancheng Jisuanji Juyu Wang [Hanbin Court Establishes Internal Network], 
RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS], May 10, 2003, 
http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=49783 (stating that the presence of a court 
network improves efficiency and quality of the court) [LP-16]; Laishan Juyu Wang Wei Shenpan 
Tisu [Laishan Internal Network Expedites Trials], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT NEWS], 
Mar. 27, 2002, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=35107 (noting how a court 
network has improved efficiency) [LP-18]. 
183 See, e.g., Pei Cong, Lasa Shi Chengguan Qu Renmin Fayuan Juyuwang Jianshe Tongguo 
Yanshou [Lhasa Chengguan District People’s Court Internal Network Construction Passes 
11/10/06 Draft                           CHINA’S NETWORK JUSTICE                                         42 
  
Not surprisingly, courts in economically developed areas have taken the 
lead in developing such networks.184  In Jiangsu Province -- one of China’s richest 
-- a 2006 report noted that computer networks had been established in 116 of the 
province’s 123 courts.185  Yet courts in less developed areas -- ranging from 
Heilongjiang in the northeast to Tibet -- have also developed court networks and 
have publicized their use in increasing both efficiency in and supervision over 
local courts.186   
Many basic level courts, in particular in rural areas or county towns, lack 
networks -- or computers.187   Judges at a rural county court in Jilin Province 
reported that the only people in the court with web access are the court president 
and the vice-presidents; judges have no access to either an internal network or to 
the external web.188  Only court leaders have computers.189  Judges at both a 
county and an intermediate court in the central province of Hubei commented that 
they lack any web access, and that many courts lack computers. 
                                                                                                                                     
Inspection], ZHONGGUO XIZANG FAYUAN WANG [CHINA TIBET COURT WEB], Aug. 15, 2005, 
http://tibet.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=506 [LP-5] (noting the important role internal 
networks play in facilitating lower courts’ reporting to higher courts). 
184 The 2003 SPC notice instructing courts to provide networks or computers on which judges 
could search for laws and other relevant materials stated that the costs of such infrastructure 
should be borne by individual courts.  See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Bangong Ting Guayu Tuiguang 
Peibei “Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” De Tongzhi [SPC Office Notice on 
Promoting and Furnishing the “China Adjudication Law Application Support System”], Nov. 4, 
2003, available at http://www.courtpress.com/subject/s1.php [LP 3]. 
185 Fenli Tuidong Quansheng Fayuan Gongzuo Xin Fazhan [Pushing for the New Development of 
All Courts in the Province], JIANGSU FAZHI BAO [JIANGSU LEGAL NEWS], Feb. 15, 2006, available 
at http://www.jsfy.gov.cn/fydt/fyyw/fyyw_esw1.htm [LZ-1]; Sheng Fayuan Jianjie [Brief 
Introduction to the Courts in the Province], JIANGSU FAYUAN WANG [JIANGSU COURT WEB], 
www.jscourt.gov.cn/fyjj/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006) [LZ-2]. 
186  Xinxihua Jigou [Informationized Institutions], Heilongjiang Sheng Xinxi Zhongxin 
[Heilongjiang Province Information Center], http://www.hljic.gov.cn/xxhsd/xxhjg27.asp (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2005) [LP-4] (discussing the establishment of internal court networks in sixty 
courts in Heilongjiang Province, and noting the role of the provincial high court in inspecting and 
overseeing internal networks in lower courts); Pei Cong [LP-5], supra note 183  (discussing the 
establishment of an internal network at a district court in Lhasa, the first in the Tibet Autonomous 
Region, and emphasizing the importance of the network in managing the acceptance, adjudication, 
and enforcement of court opinions); see also Hainan High Court Constructs New Working 
Platform Hand in Hand with Cisco [LP-6], supra note 161(stating that all courts in Hainan 
Province have been equipped with internal networks).  In some areas court networks connect 
higher courts with lower courts under their jurisdiction, although this appears to be primarily the 
case in more developed areas.  In Changchun, for example, the intermediate court is linked via an 
internal network to both the provincial high court and to lower courts. Interview 2005-70; 
Interview 2005-84.  In Xi’an, however, as of mid-2005 the intermediate court’s network was 
separate from and not connected to the internal networks at lower courts.  Interview 2005-10.   
187 Interview 2005-9. 
188 Interview 2005-95. 
189 Interview 2005-95; see also Interview 2005-83 (stating that in many rural courts in Jilin there is 
only one computer for each court, and there is often no internal network); see also Interview 2005-
18 (stating that some local courts in Xi’an lack the resources to provide computers for all judges). 
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In general, internal networks have four primary functions.  First, they 
provide searchable databases of laws, regulations, some cases, and other binding 
normative documents.  Many courts include a database of national and local laws 
developed by conjunction with the Supreme People’s Court, the People’s Court 
Press, and the Chinalawinfo Center at Peking University. 190   The database 
includes SPC interpretations, replies, and other documents, as well as some 
cases.191  Internal networks thus provide judges with electronic forms of the types 
of materials they have traditionally consulted in deciding cases, making it easier 
for judges to access such materials.192  Judges also receive information about new 
laws, regulations, and interpretations via notices on their internal court 
networks.193  Over time, how, why, and by whom the information included in 
internal webs is collected may have a major impact on how courts function and 
apply the law.  Controlling information on internal networks -- which the SPC is 
doing by requiring all courts to use standardized software --  is also a mechanism 
for controlling how judges decide cases. 
Second, some court internal networks include discussion forums in which 
judges discuss topics ranging from new cases to the quality of food in the court 
cafeteria.194  These forums are similar to those that exist on the external web, but 
are accessible only to judges from a particular court or courts.  In some courts 
judges comment that such discussion forums are rarely used to discuss substantive 
matters.195  In others, however, such as in Jiangsu Province, judges say that such 
internal discussion forums -- which are accessible to most judges in the province -
                                                 
190 “Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” Zhengding Dan [“China Judicial Law 
Application Support System” Order Invitation Form], Renmin Fayuan Chubanshe [The People’s 
Court Press], http://www.courtpress.com/subject/index_5.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2005) [LP 49]; 
Interview 2005-18; see also Interview 2005-55 (stating that the legal materials available on 
internal sites is purchased from the SPC).  In 2003 the SPC issued a notice instructing all courts to 
purchase a database of laws produced by the People’s Court Press. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Bangong Ting Guayu Tuiguang Peibei “Zhongguo Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” De 
Tongzhi [SPC Office Notice on Promoting and Furnishing the “China Judicial Law Application 
Support System”], Nov. 4, 2003, available at http://www.courtpress.com/subject/s1.php (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2005) [LP-3].  It is not clear, however, what percentage of courts have actually 
done so.  According to one report, the database is in use in all courts in Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, 
and Guangxi; in another fourteen provinces it is used by some courts. Relie Zhuhe “Zhongguo 
Shenpan Falü Yingyong Zhichi Xitong” Ronghuo “Di San Jie Guojia Dianzi Chubanwu Jiang” 
[Warm Congratulations for the “China Adjudication Law Application Support System”  Winning 
the “Third National Electronic Publications Awards”], 
http://chinalawinfo.com/ad/courtpress/index.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2006) [LZ-28]. 
191 Interview 2005-10; Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-13; Interview 2005-18. 
192 Interview 2005-63. 
193 Interview 2005-70. 
194 See. e.g., Yuhuan Renda Zong Di 194 Qi [Yuhuan People’s Congress Issue General No. 194], 
Aug. 9, 2005, http://www.yuhuanrd.gov.cn/news_show.php?show_id=986 (emphasizing the use 
of an internal court network for judges to exchange views with each other and with the court vice 
presidents responsible for their division of the court) [LP-2]. 
195 See, e.g., Interview 2005-79 (stating that court chatroom is rarely used); Interview 2005-65 
(stating that judges in Shenyang rarely use the internal BBS); Interview 2005-102 (stating that 
Beijing judges rarely use their discussion forums to discuss cases). 
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- have become important forums for discussing new legal issues and, in some 
cases, pending cases. 196   The system includes numerous discussion forums, 
moderated by individual judges, where judges can discuss cases (and other issues) 
anonymously.197  One judge noted that the forums allow judges to learn about 
new developments, both in China and overseas. 198   Likewise, all judges in 
Shanghai can participate anonymously in discussions on the Shanghai court web, 
which links all courts in the city. 199   In addition, the Shanghai Second 
Intermediate People’s Court’s internal network includes a section in which judges 
can discuss “difficult legal questions” that they encounter in cases.  The 
discussion is also accessible to judges in lower courts under the intermediate 
court’s jurisdiction.  A report on the court’s website stated that court officers can 
discuss abstract legal issues encountered in individual cases.  The court also 
organized a team of experienced judges to provide information in response to 
such abstract questions.200   
 As we have noted, Chinese judges frequently discuss cases that are under 
consideration with their peers and superiors, including superiors in higher courts.  
Discussing pending cases on discussion forums is thus an electronic version of the 
forums of vertical consultation that already exist.  Yet such discussion forums 
may also facilitate debate that judges might be less willing to engage in face to 
face with other judges or with their superiors.  For example, one report on the Liu 
Yong case201  recounted how judges on the Liaoning Province High People’s 
Court had discussed the case on their internet network while it was under 
consideration -- but did so anonymously out of concern for retribution.202  Yet 
such discussion nevertheless takes place in a controlled environment, one in 
which only court personnel participate, and one that is monitored by court 
superiors.  It may be that judges are more willing to participate in such 
                                                 
196 Interview 2005-63. 
197  Interview 2005-58; see also Interview 2005-70 (stating that judges in Changchun will 
sometimes discuss difficult cases on discussion forums on their internal network, but generally 
only after the case has been decided). 
198 Interview 2005-58; Interview 2005-77. 
199 Interview 2006-57; Interview 2006-76   
200 Faguan Shenpan Anjian Yudao Nanti, Fayuan Wangzhan Tigong Yantao Kongjian [When 
Judges Encounter Difficult Questions in Adjudicating Cases: Court Website Offers Discussion 
Space], SHANGHAI QINGNIAN BAO [SHANGHAI YOUTH DAILY], Apr. 7, 2005, available at 
http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/42734/43194/3302092.html [LP-22].  All responses must be 
approved by the intermediate court’s research office; the intermediate court will not respond to 
questions that reveal facts relating to individual cases.  Interview 2006-45.  Judges in other areas 
likewise state that they will sometimes use the internal web to discuss pending cases, in particular 
in courts where every judge has his or her own computer.  Interview 2005-83.  
201 See supra.  
202 Zhang Yue, Panjueshu Gaige Licu Touming Shenpan, Faguan Dulixing Youdai Tigao [Court 
Opinion Reform Advances Judicial Transparency, Independence of Judges Needs to be Enhanced], 
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discussions when they know they are not open to the public.  Yet judges may also 
be wary of speaking too freely in a system run by the courts with an explicit goal 
of boosting oversight over judges. 
Third, internal networks serve to disseminate information to judges, in 
particular about recent court developments.  Internal web sites sometimes include 
representative cases from provincial or municipal high courts, as well as notices 
and interpretations from such courts. 203   Local court leaders also sometimes 
include specific materials or cases from their own court on their internal web 
sites.204   These materials are designed to inform and educate judges; such cases 
are often selected because they either are particularly good examples, and are thus 
worthy of study, or carry a particular message.205   Thus, for example, in Beijing, 
courts can view interpretations from the Beijing High People’s Court, as well as 
those from the Supreme People’s Court.  The Beijing High Court posts 
descriptions of important decisions (but not court decisions themselves) on its 
internal web site for judges in the city to review.206   
 Fourth, and arguably most importantly, internal networks facilitate 
oversight over individual judges and even courts.  In many cases it appears that 
the networks have become a significant mechanism for higher–ranking judges to 
monitor the work of those below them.  In so doing, internal networks reinforce 
the hierarchical and bureaucratic structure of China’s courts.  Many internal court 
networks provide information regarding the status of cases, such as party names, 
dates on which cases were filed or dates of scheduled hearings, and whether a 
case has been resolved.  In most cases, such information is available only to 
judges handling such cases and their superiors,207  although in some courts all 
judges can view such information.208  In others, however, such information is 
available only to court superiors: judges complain of being required to enter 
extensive administrative information regarding cases into the computer system, 
but note that they themselves cannot access such information.  The monitoring 
function is backed-up by other technology.  In some courts in Beijing and 
Shanghai, court presidents, vice-presidents, and heads of individual divisions can 
                                                 
203 Interview 2005-70 (stating that in Changchun, the internal network at the intermediate court 
includes internal notices and announcements to judges, as well as a database of laws); see also 
Interview 2005-104 (stating that court networks are used to distribute notices and other 
information to all judges in Beijing); Luzhou Zhongyuan Juyuwang Shang Kai Luntan [Luzhou 
Intermediate Court Opens Forum on Internal Network], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO [PEOPLE’S COURT 
NEWS], June 21, 2004, http://rmfyb.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=70984 [LP-14] (noting the 
usefulness of a court internal network for disseminating notices and other information to judges). 
204 Interview 2005-10. 
205 Interview 2005-77 (stating that internal web sites also sometimes include descriptions of cases 
or opinions in selected cases that court education and propaganda officials have decided to post). 
206 Interview 2005-58. 
207 Interview 2005-12; Interview 2005-63.   
208 Interview 2005-49; see Fayuan Ban’an Liucheng Guanli Xitong [Administrative System for 
Court Proceedings], http://www.spsp.com.cn/chinese/products/chanpcx_dzzw_fy01.htm (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2005) (noting the use of court networks to improve management of case 
information) [LP-10].  
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watch live video streams of the proceedings in any courtroom under their 
jurisdiction.209  At the Supreme People’s Court, all judges are required to log in to 
the court network as soon as they get to the court, so that superiors can monitor 
who has arrived at work.210   
Court judgments are likewise usually available only to a limited number of 
judges and court officials.  In a few courts it appears that all judges with access to 
the internal network can view all or most decisions from their own courts,211 but 
most networks only allow court leaders to view decisions (other than those 
selected by court propaganda officials as worthy of posting on the network).212  
As one court president explained, decisions are not made generally available on 
the internal web site because they are “secret.”213  Thus court presidents and vice 
presidents often can view all cases in their courts, and heads of divisions within 
courts can view decisions in their division, but ordinary judges have access only 
to only those cases they have decided.214  As one judge in an intermediate court 
put it, each judge in the court is allowed to view different information depending 
on his or her status.215  In addition, in some jurisdictions in which networks 
connect lower and higher courts, some higher court judges are able to view 
decisions in lower courts in their jurisdiction.216    
 In Beijing, for example, only high-ranking judges can view decisions. The 
situation in Beijing is noteworthy in part because it marks a departure from the 
more open system that was in place when the Beijing courts first created an 
internal court network.  At the time, judges could view all cases decided by any 
court in Beijing.217  Judges could also view cases in their own courts in which 
they were not involved.218  The Beijing High People’s Court altered the system, 
creating instead a system that permits only higher-ranking judges to access such 
                                                 
209 Interview 2005-48; Interview 2005-58; Interview 2006-36; Interview 2006-76; see also Luzhou 
Intermediate Court Opens Forum on its Internal Network [LP-14]. 
210 Interview 2005-103; see also Yuhuan People’s Congress Issue General No. 194 [LP-2]. 
211 Interview 2005-9 (stating that at one intermediate court in Qinghai judges at the court can use 
the court’s internal network to view all cases decided at the court); Interview 2005-65 (stating that 
judges in one court in Shenyang may view judgments in already decided cases on the court’s 
internal web site). 
212  Interview 2005-49 (stating that although individual judges may be able to access certain 
information regarding cases not before them in their court or division within the court -- such as 
the date of such cases and the names of parties -- they do not have the ability to access opinions); 
Interview 2006-76 (stating that only senior judges can view decisions). 
213  Interview 2005-12; see also Interview 2005-18 (stating that the internal website of an 
intermediate case in Shaanxi includes no cases). 
214 Interview 2005-70; Interview 2005-47; Interview 2005-48.   In practice, this may not be a 
significant bar to judges obtaining information:  judges seeking information about previously 
decided cases can also obtain information by asking their colleagues.  Id.; Interview 2005-102 
(stating that judges can ask their division heads if they want to see additional materials). 
215 Interview 2006-76. 
216 Interview 2005-47 (stating that in some courts in Beijing the court network allows both higher-
ranking judges and judges at the Beijing High People’s Court to view decisions from lower courts). 
217 Interview 2005-49. 
218 Interview 2005-47. 
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information.219  The progression in Beijing appears to represent a more general 
trend.  As court networks have developed, courts have become more sophisticated 
about both the type information provided, and the degree to which higher-ranking 
judges are able to use the system as a tool for oversight. 
It would be wrong to view efforts to use technology to improve oversight 
over judges as entirely pernicious.  As we have noted, there are many problems in 
China’s courts -- including corruption, incompetence, and other forms of 
malfeasance.  If internal networks are able to ensure that cases are heard and 
decided on time -- within the time limits stipulated in law -- that would be a major 
step forward for the fairness of the Chinese system.  The same is true with having 
live images of court proceedings available to court superiors: the fact proceedings 
are on camera may reduce incentives to engage in obvious misconduct.   In this 
regard, however, the development of court internal networks reflects the 
development of the internet in China more generally.  Restricted access to the 
internet serves the state’s interests in oversight and control.  But restricted access 
may be better than no access, and in the legal system it may mean courts that 
function more fairly, more efficiently, and more consistently. 
 
III.  JUDICIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND JUDICIAL POWER 
 
 What is the relationship between how a judiciary communicates and its 
position in society?  What can we learn from the Chinese example about the 
relationship between judicial communications, judicial power, and the rule of law? 
 We suggest a central and important tradeoff for the Chinese or any legal 
system in a cheap speech environment.  First, in a country with a weak judiciary, 
the ease of criticism made possible by cheap communications technology can 
pose a serious threat to the legitimacy and power of the courts, and threaten 
progress toward the rule of law.  In more developed legal systems, where the 
judiciary is stronger, such effects may be weaker, and the salutary aspects of 
criticism more obvious.   However, in countries with less developed legal 
institutions, the power of mass, directed, and cheap criticism to weaken judicial 
institutions is much clearer. 
 The criticism born of greater informational freedom can correct injustice, 
prevent corruption, and otherwise ensure a more fair legal system.  But at the 
same time it can also destroy what little power and autonomy weak courts may 
have.  Where the courts lack authority, the media and courts may become rival 
institutions, set on a course of repeated conflict.  That is what we have seen in 
China, where courts and the media each contend that their view of the law and the 
facts is the correct one, and where each claims that the other is beset by corruption 
and incompetence.   
 But the same cheap communications can also be used to build judicial 
power.  The easier it is for judges to communicate, the easier to develop a 
                                                 
219 Interview 2005-47; Interview 2005-58 (stating that the heads of court divisions can view case 
details of cases in lower courts). 
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consistent set of rules across the country.  Cheaper communications make it easier 
for courts to apply the law consistently -- a major and often (at least in western 
writing on Chinese law) overlooked problem.220 That, in turn, gives judges the 
power to appeal to the potent principle that similar cases should be decided 
similarly. Stated differently, we suggest here that judicial “herding,” while 
considered dangerous by some of the American literature, 221  may be a key 
component of constructing judicial power.  
 Horizontal networking among judges also makes it easier for judges to 
cumulatively improve the law -- by passing on best practices to others.   It also 
facilitates the development of professional identity, which may be key to 
developing the ability to resist external pressure.  Those improvements will 
further strengthen judicial claims to legitimate resolution of cases. 
  
A.  Judicial Power 
 
 The source of judicial legitimacy and power presents one of the oldest 
questions in law and political science.  What gives courts their political power? 
The question is not easy to answer.  The judiciary, whether in China or other 
countries, typically lacks either the legitimacy of an elected body,222 or command 
of coercive physical force (an army) to enforce its will.   The judiciary’s power to 
make others obey must derive from an appeal to some other source of authority 
and legitimacy.  Invariably judges lay claim to be enforcing some higher principle 
that transcends the case before the judge.223  The exact principle may vary across 
cases, legal systems, and eras. A judge may claim to be effectuating the 
commands of the legislature, deciding the case the same as a similar case, 
enforcing basic principles of morality, or perhaps implementing a divine will.  
The strength of those claims will vary across time and among places.  But what 
these claims have in common is an appeal to an authority beyond the personal 
discretion of the judge, and a hope that, thanks to the claim, the judge’s decision 
will be obeyed. 
 From this perspective, a judiciary’s power can be said to stem from 
several social facts.  The first is how broadly any given principle the judiciary 
                                                 
220 For discussions of inconsistent application of law, see, e.g., Zhang Weiping, Minshi Susong 
Falü Shen De Gongneng Ji Gouzao [The Function and Structure of Legal Hearings in Civil 
Litigation], 5 FAXUE YANJIU [CHINESE JOURNAL OF LAW] (2005), available at 
http://www.civillaw.com.cn/weizhang/default.asp?id=22910 [LZ-22]; Yu Dongai, Panli Fa Zhidu? 
Panli Zhidu?: Yige Si Shi Er Fei de Sifa Wenti [Precedent Legal System? Precedent System?: A 
Specious Judicial Question], GONGFA PINGLUN [PUBLIC LAW 
FORUM],http://www.gongfa.com/yudapanlifa.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) [LZ-23]. 
221 See supra, text accompanying notes __-__. 
222 In the United States the majority of judges are elected.  However, most powerful judges, 
including all federal judges, are generally appointed. 
223 This argument is made in many forms in many places.  See, e.g., James Bradley Thayer, The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893); 
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); 
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
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might rely upon is accepted, both by other parts of government, who may have to 
enforce the ruling, and by the public at large, who comply voluntarily.  A second 
consideration is, even granting the existence of accepted principles, the capacity 
of the judiciary to assert the claims in the first place, a question that may depend 
on access to resources.   For example, a judge who lacks the relevant statute 
books will have trouble claiming, as a matter of principle, that she is faithfully 
implementing the will of the legislature. 
 Let us turn to the Chinese example, where the courts are weak, both 
constitutionally and in actual practice, and discuss what makes their claims to 
higher principle difficult.   Among the simplest claims of principle a court can 
make is that it is obeying the written law.  Yet even that most basic claim is 
complicated by the vagueness and confusion in many Chinese laws, and by 
overlapping claims to authority by various Party-state institutions.  Meanwhile, 
courts in poorer areas sometimes lack basic legal texts, let alone internet access.  
Similarly, judges, especially in rural areas, may lack the legal training necessary 
to articulate their claims to legitimacy.224 
 Second, as we’ve already discussed, courts in China have been isolated 
and largely unaware of what other, similar courts are doing.   This deprives the 
courts of another of the most obvious principles from which they can claim 
legitimacy:  doing what other courts have done.   The decisions made by Chinese 
courts, consequently, have lacked the consistency that might form the basis for a 
claim to legitimacy and fairness.   
 Without recourse to these more obvious claims to legitimacy, a popular 
default, as other Chinese scholars have noted, is for Chinese courts to make the 
claim to be effectuating the will of the Party.225  However, the relatively unclear 
legitimacy of the Party itself, along with the Party’s control over the courts, 
means that the authority that may be derived from such claims may be weak. In 
practice, it appears that injustice in individual cases, and inconsistent application 
of the law, are widely viewed as undermining popular confidence in the courts. 
 What our study adds to this discussion of judicial power is a new 
appreciation of how judicial communications may affect the claims to authority 
that judges may make.   Cheaper communications can both weaken and 
strengthen judicial power. 
 
B.   Net Justice 
 
                                                 
224 See Yao Xiang Jiejue Tuoqian Jiaoyu Jingfei Nayang Jiejue Hao Faguan Gongzi Zu’e Fafang 
Wenti [Resolve the Problem of Full Payment of Judge’s Salary in the Way that Late Payment of 
Education Funding is Resolved], ZHONGGUO FAYUAN WANG [CHINA COURT WEB], July 1, 2004, 
http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=121608 [LZ-21] (reporting official comments on 
the poor conditions and low salaries in local courts); Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35 
(discussing inequalities among courts in China). 
225 See Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35 (discussing court commitments to “socialist 
rule of law” theory and to maintaining social stability). 
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 The blogger theory discussed in Part I makes the classic point that cheaper 
speech ought to improve government performance. Much of the argument is a 
high-tech version of the classic view of free speech presented by John Stuart Mill 
in On Liberty, suggesting the now seemingly obvious merits of having orthodoxy 
challenged by heretical opinion.226  In its high-tech manifestation, the idea is that 
the government will commit a given number of wrongful acts.  Due to resource 
limits and agenda, traditional media will only expose a percentage of these errors.   
In theory, the sheer increase in the number of critics empowered by internet 
technology will lead to more government misdeeds being uncovered -- in the 
sense that a nation equipped with more fly-swatters will kill more flies. 
 Writers like Thomas Friedman and Nicolas Kristof rely on blogger theory 
and predict that in authoritarian regimes such as China, cheap speech ought 
similarly improve government performance -- or even lead to the downfall of such 
regimes.  Whether that is actually happening or not is the subject of an ongoing 
debate.  Both of us, in other work, have discussed this subject, emphasizing a loss 
of specific control yet a maintenance of overall control over political debate 
within China.227  More wrongs are being exposed in China, but this does not 
necessarily mean the Communist Party is any less in control than in the past.  
What we have learned in this study sheds further light on this debate.  
Blogger theory prizes criticism as a remedy for bad governance, which means the 
cheaper it is to criticize the better.  This study shows the limits of these views -- 
and urges a better understanding of the role of cheap internet criticism.  We 
uncover the problems of directed criticism, in particular attacks on a weak 
judiciary in an environment where criticism of other government actors is more 
effectively barred. 
 An important assumption of the classic free speech theory discussed above 
is that the government actors in question are powerful enough that criticism will, 
in the end, improve performance.  Yet matters may be different when some but 
not other forms of criticism are allowed, and when the criticized actors are weak 
and face ongoing legitimacy problems.  In that context, the public criticism that 
cheaper speech makes possible can erode the ability of judges to act, in effect, as 
judges.  It can weaken their capacity to act independent of public and political 
opinion, and weaken the courts relative to other political actors. 
 We have seen in this paper that criticism of the judiciary helps maintain 
the power of the Communist Party.  Net-fueled rage provides new reasons and 
justifications for the Party-state to intervene in the operation of the legal system.   
While sometimes the Party-state will prop up, as oppose to reverse, a judge’s 
decisions, either way, it is the Party-state, and not the courts, that has the final say.  
Whatever legal authority might have existed is replaced with a political decision 
made by the Party-state.  This creates incentives for the public and the media to 
appeal to Party-state actors to intervene in cases with which they disagree.  It also 
                                                 
226 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, Ch. 2 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975). 
227 See Liebman, Watchdog, supra; Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET, supra.  
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encourages courts to align their decisions with what they believe will be Party 
leaders’ views.  
 For judges, political intervention can be embarrassing, and carries the risk 
of more serious sanctions if decisions are viewed as incorrect by court or Party 
superiors.  In China, in politicized or sensitive cases, the threat of political 
intervention has always been a check on the power of the courts. Preordained 
outcomes and Party intervention have long been a feature of the Chinese legal 
system.  The new concern, however, is a type of political pressure that is born not 
of the narrow political or financial concerns of the Party or of individual Party 
officials, but the broader set of issues likely to inflame public opinion.  What’s 
new is the possibility of intervention not only for politically sensitive cases, but 
for simply unpopular decisions.   
At its worst, cheap mass criticism may lead to a legal system where Net 
reaction serves as a kind of alternative appellate review.  The case of Liu Yong’s 
execution comes closest to that extreme, one that Chinese commentators have 
compared to the court-free mass justice of the Cultural Revolution.  But more 
ominous still are the cases like Liu Yong’s that never come to light, because the 
courts do not dare practice leniency for fear of the public reaction. 
 Courts have several means of trying to avoid such interventions, but most 
lead in unfortunate directions.  First, courts facing cheap mass criticism have 
every reason to try and prevent the media and internet sites from stirring up 
controversy.   The result is the spread of false or controlled transparency in 
China’s courts.  The courts, as we are seeing, have used new technology and the 
commercialization of the media to spread positive reports about their own 
work.228  They are also making it harder for journalists to cover court proceedings.  
The emphasis China’s courts have put on managing media relations and the flow 
of information to the media in recent years reflects both the power of the Chinese 
media and the internet, and judges’ beliefs that media intervention in cases is 
often illegitimate and unhelpful.  The courts thus are now trying to exert more 
influence on the media, much as the media have tried to influence the courts. 
 Second, given that courts cannot always control media coverage, courts 
have an incentive to try and decide cases in a manner least likely to inflame public 
opinion or attract media attention.  As we’ve said, the real question is how often 
courts fail to decide cases like the Liu Yong case for fear of public outcry.   It 
goes without saying that such self-conscious efforts to avoid unpopular decisions 
are a far cry from deciding cases fairly.229  Instead, the courts may engage (like 
the media itself) in a judicial version of a self-censorship -- or make a deliberate 
effort to guess what outcomes the media or ultimately the Party might prefer.  
                                                 
228 Cf. Ni Shouming Jiyu Benwang Jiaqiang Guanli Jiji Fa Zhan [Ni Shouming Sends Words to 
Our Web: Enhance Management and Positively Develop], Hebei Sheng Gu’an Xian Remin 
Fayuan [Hebei Province Gu’an County People’s Court], Mar. 31, 2005,   
http://gaxfy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=94 (court official discussing importance of the 
internet) [LZ-65]. 
229 Interview 2005-10. 
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 What we are saying can be misinterpreted as suggesting that a judiciary is 
better off absent any external criticism.  First, none of this to suggest that there is 
no positive side to the new criticisms of China’s courts.  The optimistic face of 
Web justice is (half) of the Sun Zhigang case, where public attention demanded 
government reform, or the Nie and She cases, where internet coverage helped to 
pressure the SPC to revise procedures for capital cases.   We do not advocate 
further restrictions on speech in China.  The problem is not with the courts or the 
media, but rather lies in hypersensitivity to public option and concerns regarding 
“social stability” among Party officials, and a resulting unwillingness to refrain 
from intervening when law and public opinion conflict.   
 
* * * 
 
 The points discussed here have obvious implications for other developing 
countries, as well as for legal systems with more robust courts.   The blogger 
theories developed in the West have their limits, particularly when the 
development of the judiciary is at issue.  In many developing countries with weak 
judiciaries, it must be understood that cheap mass criticism of the courts alone 
may hinder, rather than aid, the development of an independent judiciary. The 
case of China shows how important it is for media to respect a judiciary’s role in 
society, and for courts and other state institutions to be able to resist the 
temptation to yield to public rage.  The spectacle of the Internet manhunt as a kind 
of appellate court of public opinion may have reached an extreme form in China.  
Yet no legal system can afford to ignore similar dangers.  
 This discussion also highlights a crucial difference between cheap speech 
and free speech.   Many observers of China mistake the present volume of speech 
(cheap speech) as reflecting an inevitable trend toward free speech, when the two 
are distinct.  Speech may be cheaper in the new China but at the same time only 
modestly freer, for while the volume of criticism may be growing, much is in 
permitted directions.  The media has some freedom to incite virulent public 
attacks on the judiciary (cheap speech), but not to question the legitimacy of 
Communist Party rule (free speech).   Indeed, the very fact that there remain 
significant restrictions on speech may be what makes permitted forms of criticism 
so extreme.  That is why when we warn of the dangers of cheap speech to the 
power of the Chinese judiciary, we are not discounting the value of free speech in 
the political system.  We claim only that cheapening speech along one dimension 
-- mass criticism of an already weak judiciary -- may not be a healthy 
development. 
 
C.  Judicial Networks 
  
 Cheap speech may make it easier to ignite populist campaigns against the 
judiciary.  But the flip side is that it also makes it easier for judges to learn about 
and rely on each other’s decisions -- giving a new basis for claims to legitimacy 
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and authority.   Judges who are aware of the decisions of others may make claim 
to a central principle:  that like cases be decided alike.  There is obviously far 
more to a legal system than the “like cases” principle.  Nonetheless, the idea that 
if a case is not different in relevant particulars from a case already decided it 
should be decided in the same manner is an important starting point.230  It can be 
alternatively termed a matter of human liberty,231 or the predictability of outcomes 
for parties who live under the system. 
 The recent American literature on judicial precedent cascades, discussed 
in Part I, has largely warned of the dangers of blind obedience to the decisions of 
other judges.  Our study leads us to a conclusion that is nearly the opposite:  
imitative behavior may be a crucial route for the Chinese courts to develop their 
power and autonomy.   We argue here that the rise of horizontal communications 
within the judiciary may slowly give individual judges and courts more 
confidence in their decisions, as they create more uniformity and consistency 
within their courts and across the country.  
 What happens when it gets easier and cheaper for judges to know what 
similarly situated judges are doing or have done?232  A judge now has a new 
source of (external) information, namely, the decisions made by other judges who 
faced the same problem.233  This setting -- a set of sequential and similar decision 
makers facing a similar problem with imperfect information — contains the basic 
components of the main economic models of herding behavior.234   And given 
basic assumptions, the prediction is that judges, like any other actors, will 
rationally value the information on what other decision-makers did in similar 
circumstances, or at least count it in addition to local information. 235   Even 
without a binding rule of stare decisis,236 we might expect the knowledge of what 
other judges have done to have an effect on judicial decision-making.  This is a 
complex way of saying that judges will value the acts of other judges as a source 
of information as to the right decision.237   As Professor Eric Talley writes, as 
                                                 
230  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-224 (1986); MELVIN EISENBERG, THE 
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 10-12 n.29 (1988); ROBIN WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: 
PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 107 
(2003). 
231 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY A JUSTICE, 55-56, 210-213 (1972).  
232 By assumption, the “other judges” are not superior courts or in any kind of vertical relationship, 
but equals or higher–ranking courts in other jurisdictions whose decisions are not formally binding 
in any way.  
233 The idea of such a change in technology is not far-fetched -- as various historians have pointed 
out, the common-law system may have only begun to function well after the invention of the 
printing press, which offered, among other things, a cheaper means of finding out what other 
judges had done in similar circumstances. 
234 See, e.g., Bikhchandani,  Hirshleifer & Welch, supra note 31; A. Banerjee, A Simple Model of 
Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 (1992). 
235 See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 32; Talley, supra note 34, at 87. 
236 Cf. Lewis Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 KENT CHICAGO L. REV. 
63 (1989). 
237  A number of writers in information economics discuss why decision-makers (usually in 
financial markets) will rationally place weight on the decisions made by others in similar 
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judges “learn information from previous holdings, they may rationally begin to 
treat such holdings as binding on them, even if not formally required to do so, and 
even if the case they actually hear suggests a contrary outcome.”238 
 Most of the American literature on herding and the judiciary presents the 
possibility of precendential cascades as a threat to the legal system.  The argument 
is that judges may begin to blindly obey what others have done with little regard 
as to the correctness of the rule adopted.  Yet whether this is really a problem 
depends on the legal system under study.  Where consistency and a basic rule of 
law are taken for granted, herd behavior may be a problem.   But where the 
judiciary is weak, and its decisions inconsistent, herding may be an important 
political strategy.  Our theory suggests that information about similar cases -- 
even if not acknowledged as precedent -- may make it easier for courts elsewhere 
to reach similar decisions.  The greater availability of information and debate may 
also make it more likely that courts in different areas of China will apply the law 
consistently.  Courts are increasingly looking for guidance horizontally, to equal-
level courts in other jurisdictions, rather than only looking to their vertical 
superiors.  The fact that judges are increasingly looking horizontally to each other 
also suggests the possibility of ground up development of law and courts, greater 
expansion of court autonomy, and perhaps increased professional identity among 
judges.  All of these may over time encourage courts to further develop their own 
ability to resist external pressure. 
 We can present this discussion a different way.   As we discussed above, 
the legitimacy and power of courts stems in part from their adherence to higher or 
neutral principles.239  In a mature legal system, it can be easier to find such 
principles, whether they be the “rule of clear mistake” allowing the judiciary to 
correct obvious errors made by the legislature and executive, the principle that 
like cases be treated alike, or some other principle.   Yet in a developing legal 
system the search for such rules may be more difficult.   That is why the simplest 
principle of all -- acting as other courts or judges have done -- is so important.  
Lacking any other particular claim to legitimacy, the judge may at least say that 
the court is acting in a manner consistent with what other courts have done.  
                                                                                                                                     
situations.  One reason is the possibility that the earlier actors knew something -- among Choice A 
and B, they possessed private insight or information suggesting that Choice A was preferable.  A 
second is simply a preference for conformity -- that most people prefer to do what others have 
done, either because it reduces mental strain, protects their reputation, or avoids the risk of being 
criticized.  For these and other reasons, see Bikhchandani et al., supra note 31.  An important 
point is that we might expect imitation both in the absence or presence of a formal precedent 
system.   For one thing, production of rules is part of the business of the judiciary -- so that a judge 
who does what others have done might be a good judge.  Another reason is that judicial power 
may also be maximized by consistency among judges -- a united front that deters political 
meddling.    Third, and maybe the most important for most judges, following may just be easier.   
It is much easier for judges to do what others have done -- in jargon, it minimizes decision costs. 
238 Talley, supra note 34, at 94.  Talley goes on to specify some of the ways that a legal system can 
mitigate some of the negative side-effects of precedential cascades -- which we discuss below.  
239 Along with, as Alexander Bickel argued, the power to avoid making decisions.  See BICKEL, 
supra note 223, at 49-65, 111-199. 
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Courts and legal systems that treat like cases alike would appear both more 
deserving of and more likely to receive public trust. 
 A further component of the advantages of judicial networking for judges is 
the possibility of innovation toward better rules.  In a world where judicial 
communication is difficult, an innovative decision -- either a novel resolution of 
an unclear legal issue, or a decision that appears to challenge existing laws or 
norms -- often went unnoticed.  Today, some such cases become lively topics of 
debate online -- allowing both lawyers and judges elsewhere to become aware of 
such decisions.240  Courts may be more willing to innovate when they know that 
courts elsewhere in China have done the same.  And to the extent judicial 
networks improve the law in ways that prove popular, judges may lay claim to 
greater authority and prestige.   
The implications of this China-focused discussion for the rest of the world 
should be clear. Empirically, scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter have 
documented the rise of cross-border contacts and networking among judges.241  
Slaughter’s work on judicial networks describes the increasing practice of judges 
in different countries paying attention to each other, and each other’s decisions, in 
a way that is influential despite being non-binding.  What courts in both 
international and Chinese judicial networks are seeking is the same.  They seek 
the additional power and legitimacy that is the product of judicial conformity.   
That judges in China and around the world should both seek the comfort of 
reliance on what other courts have done should be no surprise. 
We close this discussion with three caveats.  First, our findings are 
predictive rather than conclusive: we are suggesting that horizontal networking by 
Chinese judges presents one possible route to strengthening the position of 
China’s courts within the existing political system.  Second, the position of courts 
in Chinese society is the product of many factors, most importantly Party-state 
policy.  Third, the interviews conducted for this article do not permit overly broad 
conclusions regarding how many judges use the internet, or the degree to which 
such use of the internet is fostering informal precedent.  Certainly not all judges 
go online; those who do so tend to be younger, educated, and accustomed to using 
computers.   Many judges in China’s courts are older, and many older judges had 
no formal higher education prior to joining the courts.  One judge noted that only 
those judges who are “responsible” will bother to conduct online research.242 
Another judge stated that those judges who do have internet access are more 
likely to use the internet to play online games than they are to conduct legal 
research.243    Despite these caveats, we are confident that changes in how judges 
communicate will, over the long-term, affect the operation of the Chinese legal 
system.  
                                                 
240 For a discussion of innovation in the Chinese system, see Liebman, Innovation through 
Intimidation, supra note 35; Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35. 
241 SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at ch. 2. 
242 Interview 2005-19. 
243 Interview 2005-10. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The dramatic drop in the costs of communications represented by the 
internet revolution has had effects on the world both predictable and 
unpredictable.  In North America, Japan, and Europe, it is the media and 
entertainment industries that have faced the most radical challenges.  But it stands 
to reason that not every country will change in the same ways.  In China, this 
study shows that the legal system is one area where changing informational 
practices seem to be having long-term transformative effects, with important 
lessons for the rest of the world. 
The perennial question is whether China’s internet revolution is 
facilitating the “rule of law.”  We see mixed results.  At its best, judicial 
networking may strengthen the confidence and autonomy of individual judges, as 
they network with their peers.   Net justice may also be used as a corrective 
against judicial malfeasance and corruption.   But as for the delicate issue of 
external, political scrutiny of judges, matters may be getting worse before they 
start getting better.  As one of us has noted elsewhere, at the end of the day raising 
the status and authority of courts is not something courts can do on their own.244  
The central Party-state does not appear interested in fundamental changes to the 
power of the courts.  What is emerging, however, is a new and confusing dynamic 
between a commercial media, better trained judges who are beginning to aspire to 
the roles played by judges elsewhere, Party-state officials, and a reactive public.  
We do not claim to understand the full implications of that dynamic for the rule of 
law in China. 
The case study of China yields important lessons for the legal systems in 
developing and developed countries.   Every country has a de facto speech 
environment surrounding its judiciary -- a mixture of informal and formal rules 
that control how judges speak, and how people speak about judges.  What we 
learn from the study of China is how vital these speech practices can be for a 
healthy and fair legal system.  The speech norms by which a judiciary lives by 
may be vital to its power, and their erosion cannot be taken lightly.  
                                                 
244 Liebman, Restricted Reform, supra note 35. 
